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APPELLATE REVIEW IN AMERICAN MILITARY LAW
WILLiAM F.'FRATCHER*
With Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights and the common law, our
system of military justice is an inheritance from England. While the levies
of feudal barons were gradually being replaced by a royal army in the cen-
turies between the end of the Middle Ages and the outbreak of the Ameri,
can Revolution' there was developing a system of government for the English
army which came to be codified in regulations, promulgated from time to
time by the king, called articles of war, supplemented from 1689 by the
annually reenacted Mutiny Act., The central institution in the developed
system is the court-martial, a board of officers appointed by a military
commander to investigate alleged offenses, make findings and report its
sentence to the commander who appointed it. Since the latter part of the
eighteenth century the sentence of an army court-martial under the Anglo-
American system, unlike the judgment of a common law court, has had no
force or effect unless approved by superior military authority, usually the
commander who appointed the court-martial.2 Thus the relation between a
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri; Lieutenant Colonel,
Judge Advocate General's Department Reserve; A.B., 1933, A.M., 1938, Wayne
University; J.D., University of Michigan, 1936; Graduate, Command and General
Staff School, 1944.
1. The development is traced in some detail in DAVIS, TREATISE ON THE
MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, iii-vi, 1-4, 13-15 (2d ed. 1909); see also
Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically Considered 18 L. Q. REV. 117 (1902); Mc-
Lean, An Historical Sketck of Military Law 8 J. CaiM. L. 27-32 (1917). Articles
of war were issued by virtue of the royal prerogative until 1715. The Mutiny Act
of that year (1 Geo. 1, c. 9) authorized their promulgation and subsequent annual
acts continued the authorization, it being contained now in § 69 of the Army Act
(44 & 45 Vict. c. 58). From 1689 until 1879 the articles of war and the Mutiny
Act together constituted the British military code. Since 1879 the entire code has
been contained in the Army Act (42 & 43 Vict. c. revised by 44 & 45 Vict c. 58)
and the king has not promulgated articles of war although he does issue rules for
the procedure of courts-martial under authority conferred by § 70 of the Army'Act.
The Army Act has no force of its own and is put into effect yearly by an Army
and Air Force (Annual) Act.
2. DAVIS, op. cit. note 1, supra, 537; WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS, 683 (2d ed. 1896); GLENN AND SCHILLER, THE ARMY AND THE LAW
51-52 (1943). The present British requirements for approval and confirmation of
sentences are imposed by § 54 of the Army Act (44 & 45 Vict. c. 58); the present
American requirements, by Articles of War 46, 47, 48 and 49 (act June 4, 1920,
41 STAT. 796, 10 U.S.C. H8 1517, 1518, 1519, 1520 (1946). The latter will be super-
seded on February 1, 1949 by amended Articles 47, 48 and 49 (Appendix, infra.) The
early British articles did not contain such requirements. See, for example, the Arti-
cles of 1673 reprinted in DAVIS, ibid., 567-580, the Articles of 1688 reprinted in
WINTHROP, ibid., 1434-1445, and the articles summarized in JACOB, LEX CONSTrrU-
TIONIS 319-324 (1719).
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. MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
military commander and a court-martial which he appoints is analogous to
that between a Tudor king and hi; parliament. The commander may not
(with minor exceptions) impose punishment on a member of his command
without the findings and sentence of a court-martial; a Tudor king might not
levy taxes without the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal
and the Commons in Parliament assembled. But a court-martial sentence
is inchoate until approved, just as a bill passed by the Lords and Commons
was without effect unless approved by the king.
The British Articles of War of 1774 provided that no sentence of a
regimental or garrison court-martial (which, courts had jurisdiction over
petty offenses committed by noncommissioned officers and privates) should
be executed until confirmed by the commanding officer or governor of the
garrison and that no sentence of a general court-martial (the tribunal of
general jurisdiction over all persons subject to military law and all offenses
known to that law) should be put in execution until confirmed by the king,
the commander-in-chief, or some other person authorized by the king under
his sign manual to confirm.3 These articles directed that, "The Judge Ad-
vocate General, or some Person deputed by him, shall prosecute in his
Majesty's Name. . .. -4 This Judge Advocate General was a civilian mem-
ber of the ministry in office, appointed on a partisan political basis. He had
a deputy in the War Office at London who was a colonel in the army. In
practice neither the Judge Advocate General nor his War Office deputy
engaged in the actual trial of cases before courts-martial. Such cases were
conducted by the judge advocates of 'the courts-martial, who were either
field deputies of thd Judge Advocate General or officers appointed ad hoc
by the commander convening the court. After 1750 the judge-advocate of
a general gourt-martial was required to send the record of trial to the Judge
Advocate General.5 The king acted as confirming authority in cases tried
in Great Britain. The Judge Advocate General reviewed the records of trial
in these cases and submitted his advice to the king prior to confirmation.
Thus the record of every general court-martial case tried in Great Britain
received automatic review by a minister of the crown learned in the law
before the sentence could be put in execution. Power to confirm was dele-
gated to overseas commanders-in-chief. Hence the records of trial in cases
3. Sec. 15, Arts. 10, 12, 13, 14. The Articles of 1774 are reprinted in DAvis,
op. cit., note 1, supra, 581-601.
4. Sec. 15, Art. 6.
5. DAvis, op. cit., note 1, supra, 553.
[Vol. 14
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tried overseas did not reach the Judge Advocate General until after the
sentences had been confirmed and put in execution."
On June 14, 1775, the same day upon which it chose Washington as
commander-in-chief, the Continental- Congress appointed a committee, con-
sisting of Messrs. Washington, Schuyler, Deane, Cushing and Hewes, to
c... bring in a dra't of Rules and regulations for the government of the
army."7 The committee reported proposed articles of war, which were con-
sidered on several successive days and adopted on June 30, 1775. These
articles were, in substance, a restatement of the British Articles of 1774 and
contained the same provisions for confirmation of sentences of regimental
and garrison courts-martial by the commanding officer.9 The British require-
ment of confirmation of sentences of general courts-martial was omitted,
however, and the American Articles of 1775 contained no provision relative
to approval or confirmation of sentences of general courts-martial. They
did authorize the general or commander in chief to pardon or mitigate court-
martial sentences.10 The 1775 Articles of War also omitted all references
to the Judge Advocate General, his deputies, and judge advocates, making
no provision as to who should prosecute cases before courts-martial. In the
British practice, the members of the court were sworn by the judge advo-
cate.'1 The new American articles conferred this function on the president
of the court,'2 thus suggesting that Congress did not then contemplate the
existence of judge advocates in the American system.
In the English practice and in the American practice from 1776 to 1920
the judge advocate of a court-martial was something more than a prose-
cutor. He administered oaths to the members of the court and the wit-
nesses, collected and presented the evidence for both sides of the case, ad-
6. 9 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND 101 (1909); ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
l1th ed., Judge Advocate General; Winthrop, op. cit., note 2, supra, 60, 61; 7
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 516-519 (1907).
7. 2 JLS. CONT. CONG. 90.
8. Ibid., 110, 111, 112. The articles are reprinted in WINTHROP, op. cit., note
2, supra, 1478-1486. Additional punitive articles were adopted on November 7,
1775, 3 JLS. CONT. CONG. 331-334.
9. Arts. XXXVII, XXXVIII, XXXIX.
10. Art. LXII, "That the general, or commander in chief for the time being,
shall have full power of pardoning, or mitigating any of the punishments ordered
to be inflicted, for any of the offences mentioned in the foregoing articles; and
every offender, convicted as aforesaid, by any regimental court-martial, may be
pardoned, or have his punishment miigated by the colonel or officer commanding
the regiment."
11. British Articles of War of 1774, § 15, Art. 6.
12. Art. LIII.
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vised the court and the accused (defendant) on questions of law, protected
the rights of the accused, summed up the case at the conclusion of the trial
in the manner of an English common law judge's charge to a jury, and pre-
pared the record of trial."3 As the performance of most of these duties is
essential, the lack of provision with regard to them in the, 1775 Articles of
War must have proved inconvenient. General Washington assuxmed com-
mand of the army at Cambridge on July 3, 1775. On July 29 the Con-
tinental Congress elected William Tudor, Esq., Judge Advocate of the
army.14 A year later, on August 10, 1776, Congress resolved, "That William
Tudor, judge advocate general, have the rank of lieutenant colonel in the
army of the United States."'5 The use of the term, "judge advocate general"
may have been inadvertent. In any event the bestowal of military rank and
the actual subsequent practice indicite that Colonel Tudor's position was
much more like that of a British deputy judge advocate general for an over-
seas command, that is, an officer engaged as prosecutor in the actual trial
of cases, than that of the British Judge Advocate General, a civilian minister
of the crown with functions similar to those of an appellate judge.' 0
In August 1776 Colonel Tudor delivered to Congress a letter from
General Washington recommending revision of the articles of war and him-
self prepared a memorandum of recommended changes. Mr. John Adams
and Mr. Jefferson were appointed a committee to hear Tudor and revise
the articles. The committee recommended what was virtually a literal
transcription of the British Articles of War of 1774 and these articles were
adopted on September 20, 1776, over the vigorous opposition of some mem-
bers -who seem to have preferred something more like the common law
13. 9 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND, 97, 98, 101, 102 (1909); ENCYCLOPAVDIA
BRITANNICA, 11th ed., Judge Advocate General; 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAws
op ENGLAND, 518, 519 (1907)-; WINTHROP, Op. ci., note 2, supra, q62, 303; DAVIs, op.
cit., note 1, supra, 34-38.
14. 2 JLs. CONT. CONGO 221. Mr. Tudor (A.B., Harvard, 1769) had studied law
under John Adams and been admitted to the BostonBar in 1772. Fratcher, Notes
on tke History of the Judge Advocate General's Department, 1 JUDGE ADV. J. 5 (June,
1944).
15. 5 JLs. CoNT. CONG. 645.
16. Colonel Tudor and his successor are known to have conducted a number
of trials in person, WINTHROP, op. cit., note 2, supra, 264 note. Other officers, vari-
ously styled "deputy judge advocate general,". "judge advocate" and "deputy judge
advocate" also conducted trials during the Revolutionary War. On June 6, 1777
Congress accorded two of these the rank and pay of captains, 8 JLs. CONT. CoNo.
421. On Dcember 21, 1779 Congress granted the Judge Advocate General the
subsistence of a colonel and other judge advocates that of lieutenant colonels, 15
JLs. CoNr. CONG. 1397. Fratcher, op. cit., note 14, supra, 5, 6.
[Vol. 14
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system of criminal procedure. 7 The new articles provided that, "The judge-
advocate general, or some person deputed by him, shall prosecute in the
name of the United States of America, ." that the judge-advocate of a gen-
eral court-martial should transmit the briginal proceedings and sentence to
the secretary at war, and that no sentence of a general court-martial should
be put in execution until confirmed by Congress or the general or commander
in chief of the forces of the United States.18 This last provision was amended
on April 14, 1777 so as to empower "the continental general commanding in
the state" to confirm sentences of general courts-martial.19
Section 14 of the Articles of War of 1776, which governed procedural
matters, was repealed by the Congress of the Confederation on May 31,
1786 and replaced by twenty seven articles of war entitled, "Administration
of Justice.,20 These articles prcvided that, "The judge advocate, or some
other person deputed by him, or by the general or officer commanding the
army, detachment or garrison, shall prosecute in the name of the United
States of America," repeated the direction that the judge advocate, or per-
son officiating as such, at any court-martial, should transmit the original
proceedings and sentence to the secretary at war,21 and included the fol-
lowing provision, which has had an important influence on subsequent Amer-
ican legislation governing review of, general court-martial records:
"But no sentence of a court-martial shall be carried into exe-
cution until after the whole proceedings shall have been laid before
the said general or officer commanding the troops for the time being
[i.e., the commander who appointed the court]; neither shall any
sentence of a general court-martial in time of peace, extending to
the loss of life, the dismission of a commissioned officer, or which
shall either in time of peace or war respect a general officer, be
17. 5 JLs. CONT. CONG. 670, 670-71 note, 764, 787, 788 note, 788-807. The
articles are reprinted- in WINTHROP, op. cit., note 2, supra, 1489-1503, tnd DAVIS,
op. cit., note 1, supra, 602-618.
18. Sec. XIV, Arts. 3, 5; Sec. XVIII, Art. 3.
19. 7 JLS. CONT. CONG. 265.
20. 30 JLs. CONT. CONG. 316-322. The articles are reprinted in WINTHROP,
op. cit., note 2, supra, 1504-1508, and DAVIs, op. cit., note 1, supra, 619-624. The
primary purpose of the 1786 revision was to reduce the required membership of a
general court martial from thirteen officers to five, a change made necessary by the
prevalence of small commands without thirteen available officers (Letter of Gen.
Henry Knox,,Secretary at War, to Congress, March 21, 1786, 30 JLs. CoNT. CONG.
119-120). The 1786 articles were drafted by a committee of Congress consisting
of Arthur St. Clair, Henry Lee and John Lawrance (30 JLs. CONT. CONG. 145, 146).
Colonel Lawrance, a member of the New York Bar, had been Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Army, in succession to Colonel Tudor, from April 10, 1777 to June 3,
1782 (Fratcher, op. cit., note 14, supra, 5, 6).
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carried into execution, until after the whole proceedings shall have
been transmitted to the secretary at war, to be laid before Con-
gress for their confirmation, or disapproval, and their orders on
the case. All other sentences may be confirmed and executed by the
officer ordering the court to assemble, or the commanding officer for
the time being, as the case may be. '122
Mr. Justice Blackstone was of the opinion that articles of war should
be promulgated by statute instead of by executive order.23 Although his
view did not prevail in Great Britain for over a century, it was adopted
in the American Constitution of 1789, which allocated to Congress the
power to make rules for the government of the'land and naval forces. 24 The
First Congress exercised this power oniy by continuing in force the Articles
of War of 1776 as amended in 1786.5 By the act of May 30, 1796 the
Fourth Congress amended the article quoted in the preceding paragraph
22. Art. 2. Tlie articles of war of 1775 and 1776 contained no provision as
to what commanders could convene (appoint) general courts-martial. The omis-
sion was probably due to the fact that the English provision on the subject was
contained in the Mutiny Act, not the articles of war. DAVIS, op. cit., 490. Express
authority was conferred on "the continental general commanding in the state" by
resolution of April 14, 1777 (7 JLs. CONT. CONG. 265), and the later codes of articles
of war 'all contained provisions on this subject: Art. 2 of 1786 (general or officer
commanding the troops); Art. 65 of 1806 (any general officer commanding an
army, or Colonel commanding a separate department); act Dec. 24, 1861, 12 STAT.
330 (commander of a division or separate brigade in time of war); act Mar. 3, 1873,
17 STAT. 604 and R. S. § 1326 (Superintendent of the Military Academy); Arts.
72 and 73 of 1874 (any general officer commanding an army, a Territorial Division
or a Department and, in time of war, the commander of a division, or of a separate
brigade of troops); act July 5, 1884, 23 STAT. 121 (colonel commanding a separate
Department); act Mar. 2, 1913, 37 STAT. 722, and Art. 8 of 1916 and 1920 (Presi-
dent of the United States, commanding officer of a territorial division or depart-
ment, Superintendent of the Military Academy, commanding officer of an army,
an'army corps, a division, or a separate brigade, and, when empowered by tho
President, the commanding officer of any district or of any force or body of troops);
Art. 8 of 1948 (see. 206, Selective Service Act of 1948, effective Feb. 1, 1949)
(President of the United States, commanding officer of a Territorial department,
Superintendent of the Military Academy, commanding officer of an Army group,
an Army an Army corps, a division, a separate brigade, or corresponding unit of
the Ground or Air Forces, or any command to which a member of the Judge Ad-
vocate General's Department is assigned as staff judge advocate, and, when em-
powered by the President, the commanding officer of any district or of any force
or body of troops). It has been held that the President could appoint general courts-
martial without statutory authority, he being the constitutional commander-in-
chief of the Army. Runkle v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 396 (1886), aff'd, 122
U. S. 543 (1886); Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173 (1893), aff'd, 165 U. S.
'553 (1896).
23. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *416 (1765).
24. Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 14.
25. Sec. 4, act Sept. 29, 1789, 1 STAT. 96. The Judiciary Act was approved
September 24, 1789 (1 STAT. 73).
6
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by substituting the President for Congress. 26 The articles of war were re-
vised and reenacted in 1806 but no substantial change was made in this
article and it remained in force until the enactment of the Revised Statutes
in 1874.27
The last Revolutionary Judge Advocate General was mustered out of
the service on November 3, 1783 and the United States did not again have
an officer with that title until the Civil War. A captain of infantry was
detailed as Judge Advocate of the Army from April 1, 1801 to March 16,
1802 under statutory authority.28 He was, apparently, a prosecuting officer.
Throughout the early nineteenth century records of trials by general courts-
martial were, as a matter of military usage, transmitted to the Adjutant
General, then the principal staff officer of the army and custodian of its
files and records.' The Adjutant General reviewed such records of trial and
occasionally sent letters of criticism or recommendation to the field com-
manders concerned. From 1844 on. the Adjutant General performed this
function through a series of captains and lieutenants on duty in his office,
detailed as Acting Judge Advocate of the Army. The act of March 2, 184929
authorized the President to detail a captain as Judge Advocate of the Army,
with the brevet rank and pay of a major of cavalry. The captain who was
then serving as Acting Judge Advocate in the Adjutant General's Office
was detailed under this authority* and retained the position as long -as it
existed.30 The Judge Advocate of the Army appointed'under the act of 1849
26. Sec. 18; 1 STAT. 485. See also sec. 10, act March 16, 1802, 2 STAT. 134.
FQr ninety years it was assumed that the Secretary of War could confirm on behalf
of the President. Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543 (1886), held that, al-
though the sign manual of the President was not required, his personal exercise of
discretion was. Since that decision confirmations have usually been authenticated
by the sign manual of the President. W NImROP, op. cit., note 2, supra, 705-708. See
note 124, infra.
27. Art. 65, act April 10, 1806, 2 STAT. 359, 367. The 1806 version substituted
the Secretary of War for the Secretary at War. Article 65 was amended in 1830 in
respects not here material (act May 29, 1830, 4 STAT. 417).
28. The office was created by sec. 2, act March 3, 1797, 1 STAT. 507, and abol-
ished by the act of March 16, 1802, 2 STAT. 132. Its holder was entitled to $25 per
month in addition to the pay of his grade. The -only incumbent was Captain
Campbell Smith, 4th Infantry. Sec. 19, act Jan. 11, 1812, 2 STAT. 674, authorized
the appointment of division judge advocates with the pay of majors of infantry
if civilians or $30 per month in addition to the pay of their grades if detailed from
the line of the army. Sixteen persons served under this legislation. The number
authorized was changed by the acts of April 24, 1816, 3 STAT. 297, and April 14,
1818, 3 STAT. 426, and the office was abolished by the act of March 2, 1821, 3 STAT.
615.
29. 9 STAT. 351.
30. Captain John Fitzgerald Lee, Ordnance Department, graduate of the
United States Military Academy in the class of 1830. The subject matter of this
7
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examined records of trials by general courts-martial, rendered opinions on
those in which the sentences required confirmation by the President before
their transmission to the President, and sent letters of criticism or advice
'to field commanders."' His functions were, therefore, similar to those of
the British Judge Advocate General. That official, however, being a member
of Parliament, a member of the ministry in office and a privy councillor witfh
direct access to the sovereign, held a position of much greater prestige, in-
fluence and independence than his American counterpart, a junior army
officer who was not even a lawyer.
Section 5 of the act of July 17, 1862'2 provided,
"That the President shall appoint, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, a judge advocate general, with the rank, pay
and emoluments of a colonel of cavalry, to whose office shall be
returned, for revision, the records and proceedings of all courts-
martial and military commissions, and where a record shall be kept
paragraph is treated in greater detail in Fratcher, op. cit., note 14, supra, 6, 7. Tho
facts stated therein were secured by examination of numerous records in the Na-
tional Archives and the Office of The Judge Advocate General, individual citation
of which is not practicable. The Articles of War of 1806, like those of 1786, pro-
vided that, "The judge advocate, or so.me person deputed by him, or by the general,
or officer commanding the army, detachment, or garrison, shall prosecute in the
name of the United States. .. " (Art. 69). Brevet Major Lee informed Colonel
Winthrop that he never made such a deputation, WINTHROP, op. cit., note 2, supra,
265, note.
31. Brevet Major Lee's position and functions are illustrated by the following
letter which he wrote to Brevet Major General John E. Wool, then in command
of the Eastern Division (a territorial command), with headquarters at Troy, New
York (1 MS Op. JAG, p. 43):
"Headquarters of the Army,
"Washington, D. C., Oct. 21, 1850
"General:-
"I am instructed by the General-in-Chief to invite your attention to that part
of ,the sentence of the General Ct. Martial which convened at Ft. Constitution,
N. H. on the 10th ult. approved and ordered to be carried into effect by your
Division Order No. 57, current series, which, in the cases of Privates McMahon,
Kennedy, Hannever and Smith, directs, 'for the period of one year, a band of iron
about the neck with 7 prongs each 7 inches long.'
"The General-in-Chief is of opinion, that such a collar from the suffering it
seems designed and is certainly capable of causing, would inflict a punishment cruel
and unusual, and consequently illegal.
"With this opinion I am directed to convey to you the desire of the General-




"Judge Advocate of the Army."
32. 12 STAT. 598. Sec. 6 provided for the appointment of a judge advocate for
each army in the field, with the rank and pay of a major of cavalry, to perform
his duties under the direction of the Judge Advocate General.
[Vol. 14
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of all proceedings had thereupon. And no sentence of death, or
imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be carried into execution
until the same shall have been 'approved by the President."
It will be recalled that, under the articles of war of 1786 and 1806, the
only court-martial sentences which required confirmation by the President
in time of war were those imposed upon general officers.3 3 By adding all
death and penitentiary sentences the act of July 17, 1862 'greatly increased
the number of cases requiring presidential confirmation. This was modified
in 1863 and 1864 by statutory authority to execute sentences of spies, de-
serters, mutineers, murderers and guerrilla marauders after confirmation
by the commanding general in the field.3 4 The act of July 17, 1862, more-
over, made the position of Judge Advocate General one of considerable im-
portance and influence. These were enhanced by President Lincoln's ap-
pointment to the office of Joseph Holt, a lawyer of distinction who had been,
successively, Commissioner of Patents, Postmaster General and Secretary of
War under President Buchanan. They were further enhanced by the act of
June 20, 186435 which accorded the Judge Advocate General the rank and
pay of a brigadier general and provided him with an assistant with the rank
and pay of a colonel. The result of this legislation was to create an Ameri-
can Judge Advocate General with functions, prestige and influence compar-
able to those of the British Judge Advocate General. It must be remembered,
however, that in the British practice all records of trials by general courts-
martial held in Great Britain were reviewed by the Judge Advocate General
prior to executionof the sentences whereas in .this country the review came
33. Article 89 of 1806 authorized a field commander who had power to order
the execution of a sentence of death or cashiering an officer to ". . . suspend, until
the pleasure of the President of the United States can be known." This provision
was interpreted to confer upon the President in a case so suspended the same
powers he had in a case in which his confirmation was required by law, WINTHRoP,
op. cit., note 2, supra, 713-714; DIG. Ops. JAG, 1868, 39-41. The provision was
carried into the Revised Statutes of 1874 as Article 111 with the substitution of tha
word "dismissal" for "cashiering," R. S. § 1342. See note 77, infra.
34. Sec. 21, act March 3, 1863, 12 STAT. 735 (spies, deserters, mutineers and
murderers); sec. 1, act July 2, 1864, 13 STAT. 356 ("sentences against guerilla
marauders for robbery, arson, burglary, rape, assault with intent to commit rape,
and for violation of the laws and customs of war, as well as sentences against spies,
mutineers, deserters and murderers.") The act of Dec. 24, 1861, 12 STAT. 330, had
empowered the commander of a division, or separate brigade to appoint general
courts-martial in time of war, "Provided, That sentences of such courts extending
to loss of life or dismission of a commissioned officer shall require the confirmation
of the general commanding the army in the field to which the division or brigade
belongs."
35. 13 STAT. 145."
9
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after the sentences had been put in execution, except in the still relatively
narrow class of cases requiring confirmation by the President. The signif-
icance of this difference will be discussed hereinafter.
The articles of war were rearranged and reworded in the Revised Stat-
utes of 1874. The only important change made in the provisions relative
to approval and confirmation of sentences and review of records of trial by
the Judge Advocate General was that sentences to confinement in a peni-
tentiary no longer required confirmation by the President, as they had
since 1862.36
Proposals to revise the articles of war were made in 1888 and 1903 and
a draft of proposed revised articles was prepared in 1903 by Colonel Enoch
H. Crowder, Judge Advocate, 37 but not enacted. Another draft was pre-
pared in 1912 by Captain Edward A. Kreger, Judge Advocate,3 8 under the
36. R. S. 1199, 10 U.S.C. § 62 (1946), "The Judge Advocate General shall
receive, revise, and cause to be recorded the proceedings of all courts-martial, courts
of inquiry and military commissions, and perform such other duties as have been
performed heretofore by the Judge Advocate General of the Army. (Still in force.)
R.S. 1201, 10 U.S.C. § 63 (1946), "Judge advocates shall perform their duties
under the direction of the Judge Advocate General. (Still in force.)
R. S. § 1342. The pertinent articles follow:
"Art. 104.-No sentence of a court-martial shall be carried into execution until
the whole proceeding shall have been approved by the officer ordering the court,
or by the officer commanding for the time being. (The act of July 27, 1892, 27 STAT.
277, 278, substituted the word "same" for the words "whole proceeding.")
"Art. 105.-No sentence of a court-martial inflicting the punishment of death,
shall be carried into execution until it shall have been confirmed by the President;
except in the cases of persons convicted, in time of war, as spies, mutineers, de-
serters, or murderers, and in the case of guerilla marauders, convicted, in time of
war, of robbery, burglary, arson, rape, assault with intent to commit rape, or of
violation of the laws and customs of war; and in such excepted cases the sentence
of death may be carried into execution upon confirmation by the commanding gen-
eral in the field, or the commander of the department, as the case may be.
"Art. 106.-In time of peace no sentence of a court-martial, directing the
dismissal of an officer, shall be carried into execution, until it shall have been con-
firmed by the President.
"Art. 107.-No sentence of a court-martial appointed by the commander of a
division or of a separate brigade of troops, directing the dismissal of an officer, shall
be carried into execution until it shall have been confirmed by the general com-
manding the army in the field to which the division or brigade belongs.
"Art. 108.-No sentence of a court-martial, either in time of peace or in time
of war, respecting a general officer, shall be carried into execution, until it shall
have been confirmed by the President.
"Art. 109.-All sentences of a court-martial may be confirmed and carried into
execution by the officer ordering the court, or by the officer commanding for the
time being, where confirmation by the President, or by the commanding general
in the field, or commander of the department, is not required by these articles."
37. B.S., United States Military Academy, 1881; LL.B., Missouri, 1886; Asso-
ciate Justice, Philippine Supreme Court, 1899-1900; Judge Advocate General, 1911-
1923; Ambassador to Cuba, 1923-1927.
38. B.S., Iowa State College, 1890; Acting Judge Advocate General, A.E.F.,
France, 1918; The Judge Advocate General, 1928-1931.
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direction of General Crowder, then the Judge' Advocate General, and sub-
mitted to Congress by Secretary of War Stimson in April of that year. This
draft, with some changes, was adopted on August 29, 1916 to take effect,
except as to a few provisions which were effective at once, on March 1,
1917.30 The new articles reworded and consolidated the provisions of the
Revised Statutes relative to approval and confirmation of sentences but made
no change in them except to include sentences involving suspension or dis-
missal of a cadet in the class which required confirmation by the President
and to exclude wartime death sentences for rape from that class.40
The two principal forms of appellate review known to American military
law prior to 1920, review by the commander who appointed the court or his
successor, usually referred to as the reviewing authority, and, additional re-
view by the President or some other superior, usually referred to as the
confirming authority, have been traced from the inception of our army. As
has been seen, the first has been required since 1776 as to all types of courts-
martial and all classes of cases. The latter has been required only in a lim-
ited class of cases tried by general courts-martial. As has also been seen,
the requirement that general court-martial records be sent to the War De-
partment permitted some review and corrective action even though the
39. Secs. 3, 4, act August 29, 1916, 39 STAT. 650, 670.
40. Special provision as to guerilla marauders was omitted. The provision as
to cadets was derived from R. S. § 1326, which was a reenactment of Act Mar. 3,
1873, 17 STAT. 604, and authorized the Superintendent of the Military Academy
to convene general courts-martial for the trial of cadets but not to execute sen-
tences of suspension and dismission. The pertinent provisions of the 1916 articles
follow:
"Art. 46. Approval and Execution of Sentence.-No sentence of a court-martial
shall be carried into execution until the same shall have been approved by the
officer appointing the court or by the officer commanding for the time being.
"Art. 48. Confirmation-When, Required.-In addition to the approval re-
quired by article forty-six, confirmation by the President is required in the following
cases before the sentence of a court-martial is carried into execution, namely:
"(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer:
"(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer, except that in time
of war a sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer below the grade of brigadier
general may be carried into execution upon confirmation by the commanding gen-
eral of the Army in the field or by the commanding general of the territorial de-
partment or division;
"(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet; and
"(d) Any sentence of death, except in the cases of persons convicted in time
of war of murder, rape, mutiny, desertion, or as spies; and in such excepted cases
a sentence of death may be carried into execution upon confirmation by the com-
manding general of the Army in the field or by the commanding general of the
Territorial department or division.
"When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as
the approving authority no additional confirmation by him is necessary."
19491
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sentences had already been put in execution. Some other types of appellate
review known to our military law should be mentioned.
The British Articles of War of 1774 and the American articles of 1775,
1776, 1806 and 1,874 provided that a soldier who thought himself wronged
by an officer might complain to his regimental commander. The regimental
commander'was required to summon a regimental court-martial to investi-
gate the grievance. Either party might appeal from the regimental court-
martial to a general court-martial but if the latter considered the appeal
groundless and vexatious it could punish the party appealing.4' An appeal
resulted in a hearing de nwvo by the general court-martial. Colonel Winthrop
states that this appellate prdcedure was "comparatively rarely availed of,"
being discouraged by the threat of punishment for a vexatious and ground-
less, appeal.42
Article of War 104 in the codes of 1916, 1920 and 1948 authorizes com-
manding officers to impose punishment of a limited character on members
of their commands without the intervention of a court-martial unless the
accused demands trial by court-martial. A person so punished may appeal
to the next superior authority but may in the meantime be required to un-
dergo the punishment. As the waiver of trial by court-martial is virtually
an admission of guilt, the appeal may only be on the ground that the pun-
ishment is unjust or disproportionate to the offense.48
41. British Articles, 1774, Sec. 12 Art. 2; American Articles, 1775, Art. XIV;
1776, Sec. XI, Art. 2; 1806, Art. 35; 1874, Art. 30.
42. WIrNaoP, op. cit., note 2, supra, 929, 935. This threat was very real.
Captain Hough describes a case in which a private serving ,n the British army in
India complained that his captain had overcharged him for tea, sugar, washing
and a pair of boots. The regimental court-martial found the charges proper and the
private appealed to a general court-martial, which found that the appeal was
vexatious and groundless, "And they do therefore sentence him.., to receive seven
hundred (700) lashes on his bare back, in the usual manner." HOUGH, THE PuAcrxcTE
OF COURTS-MARrIAL AND OTHER MILITARY CouRTs 239 (1834).
. 43. In its 1916 form this article provided, "The disciplinary punishments au-
thorized by this article may include admonition, reprimand, withholding of privi-
leges, extra fatigue, and restriction to certain specified limits, but shall not include
forfeiture of pay or confinement under guard." In its 1920 form (§ 1, ch. II, act June
4, 1920, 41 STAT. 808, 10 U.S.C. § 1576 (1946)) the article limited the duration of
the punishments of withholding of privileges, extra fatigue, and restriction to one
week and empowered commanding officers of the grade of brigadier general or higher,
in time of war or grave public emergency, to forfeit up to half of one month's pay
of a lieutenant or captain. In its 1948 form (§ 238, Selective Service Act of 1948,
Pub. L. 759, 80th Cong., effective Feb. 1, 1949) the article limits the duration of
all punishments, other than forfeiture, to one week from the date imposed and
empowers a commanding officer who has power to appoint general' courts-martial, in
war or peace, to forfeit up to half the pay per month for three months of any warrant
officer or officer of his command below the grade of brigadier general. At present
12
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Section-7 of the act of July 17, 186244 authorized the trial of persons
accused of offenses punishable by a kegimental or garrison court-martial by
a single field officer of the regiment, who was required to make a record of
his proceedings. The sentences of such a field officer could not be carried
into execution until approved by the brigade or post commander. This au-
thority, with the same requirement of approval by the brigade or post com-
mander, was given by the Revised Statutes of 1874, but limited to time of
war.45 The act of October 1, 189040 established a single officer summary
court with jurisdiction in time of peace over offenses cognizable by a garri-
son or regimental court-martial. Unlike that of the wartime field officer, a
sentence of a summary court-martial does not require approval by anyone
but the commander who appointed it. The act of June 18, 189847 authorized
summary courts-martial in time of war and eliminated the field officer sitting
as a court.
The act of March 2, 191348 eliminated the ancient regimental and garri-
son courts-martial entirely and substituted a one-member summary court-
martial with power, in war or peace, to impose Up to three months' con-
finement, and a three member special court-martial, with power to im-
pose up to six months' confinement. These courts were to be appointed
and their sentences approved and ordered executed by regimental, post and
like commanders. The 1920 Articles of War reduced the maximum period of
confinement imposable by a summary court-martial *to one month.4 ' The
rates, this will permit forfeitures as high as $900 to be imposed on officers. Frequent
appeals by officers who deem forfeitures imposed upon them excessive may be
anticipated.
44. 12 STAT. 598.
45. Arts. 81, 110. Approval by a camp commander was authorized by the act
of July 27, 1892, 27 STAT. 278.
46. 26 STAT. 648.
47. 30 STAT. 483.
48. 37 STAT. 721. Like provisions were contained in Arts. 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14
of 1916.
49. Art. 14. Act Mar. 2, 1913, 37 STAT. 721, and Art. 13 of 1916 provided
that special courts-martial could not try officers. This restriction was lifted by
Art. 13 of 1920 but the President was authorized to limit the jurisdiction of special
courts-martial over persons. He did so limit it until 1943 to persons not above
the grade of master sergeant, G.O. 71, War Dept., Dec. 1, 1920; MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, U. S. ARMY, 1921, 655; par. 14, M.C.M., 1928 ("MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, U. S. AIUmr," will be abbreviated in subsequent notes to "M.C.-
M.") Since 1943 only commissioned officers have been excepted from the jurisdiction
of special courts-martial (par. 14, M.C.M., 1928, 1943 reprint ed.). The 1948 amend-
ment to Art. 13 (sec. 210, Selective Service Act of 1948, effective Feb. 1, 1949)
takes away the power of the President to except persons subject to military law
from such jurisdiction. Certain superior noncommissioned officers are excepted from
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1916 and 1920 Articles of War did not require any approval or confirmation
of sentences-of special and summary courts-martial, other than that of the
commander who appointed the court, but they did provide that, after action
by that commander, the records of trials by special courts-martial and re-
ports of trials by summary courts-martial should be transmitted to ". . .such
general headquarters as the President may designate in regulations, there to
be 'filed in the office of the judge advocate."' 0 The original regulations im-
plementing this provision merely designated the headquarters of the com-
mander with power to appoint a general court-martial for the command as
the depository of such records and reports.,' Since 1928 the presidential reg-
ulations have contained the following provision:
"The officer immediately exercising general court-martial juris-
diction over a command has supervisory powers over special and
summary courts-martial therein. He will'cause the records or re-
ports of trial of such courts when forwarded to him as required by
87c to be examined for errors, defects, or omissions. He may take
any authorized corrective or modifying action by him deemed
necessary or desirable with respect to the sentence, or he may bring
the matter to the attention of the authority that approved the sen-
tence or his successor. '5 2
In practice the examination has been made by or under the direction
of the staff judge advocate of the superior command, a staff officer learned
in the law, of whom more will be said later. There has been doubt as to the
validity and scope of the last sentence of the provision, particularly as to
whether it empowers a superior commander to vacate a conviction as dis-
the jurisdiction of summary courts-martial by ,residential regulation issued under
Art. 14 and the article itself provides that other noncommissioned officers may not
be tried by summary court-martial without their own consent or the authority of
a commander who has power to appoint a general court-martial (M.C.M., 1928, par.
50: Art. 36 of 1916 and 1920. This was amended by sec. 217, Selective Service
Act of 1948, effective Feb. 1, 1949, to require that special court-martial records in-
volving approved sentences to bad conduct discharge be forvarded to The Judge
Advocate Gbneral for review.
51. Par. 367, M.C.M., 1917; par. 367, M.C.M., 1921; par. 87, M.C.M., 1928.
As to who has power to appoint general courts-martial, see note 22, .upra.
52. Par. 91, M.C.M., 1928. The report of a trial by summary court-martial
sent to the commander exercising general court-martial jurisdiction is a carbon copy
of the record. As such courts are not required to record testimony and arguments,
the record consists only of the charges, the pleas, the findings, the sentence and the
action of the commander who appointed the court. This being so, the scope of
inquiry on examination of a report 'of trial by summary court-martial is necessarily
limited. Par. 86, App. 8, M.C.M., 1928.
[Vol. 14
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tinct from merely reducing the sentence.5 3 Nevertheless, by requiring exam-
ination under the supervision of a superior commander of every record of
trial by inferior court-martial the provision has afforded, if not genuine ap-
pellate review of the proceedings of such tribunals, at least a desirable check
on their activities.
SCOPE AND EFFECT OF REVIEW PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I
The scope of appellate review based on the record of the inferior
tribunal, as distinguished from trial de novo by the appellate court, is neces-
sarily limited by the scope of that record. The common law record consisted
of the judge's commission, the indictment, the plea of the defendant, the
verdict, and the judgment. It contained no report of the testimony, proceed-
ings on interlocutory motions, the arguments of counsel or the charge of
the judge. Review on writ of error, the only form of appellate review af-
forded by the dommon law in criminal cases, was limited to errors appear-
53. An opinion of The Judge Advocate General of 1932 ruled that the jurisdic-
tion of an officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the proceedings
of special and summary court -martial appointed by his subordinates is confined
to the remission, mitigation ?r suspension of sentences and that, therefore, an
order of a superior commander purporting to disapprove and set aside the findings
and sentence of a special court-martial which had been approved and promul-
gated by a subordinate commander was a nullity. JAG 220.26, Aug. 30, 1932, DIG.
Ops. JAG, 1912-40, sec. 403 (5). But an opinion of 1921 had held that it was
" ... in accordance with the well-established custom of the service . . ." for the
superior commander to direct the subordinate commander to disapprove the pro-
ceedings of a summary court-martial appointed by the latter. JAG 250.452, Oct.
29, 1921, DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912-40, sec. 403 (5). And it had been ruled as follows
when the Articles of War of 1806 were still in force: "The duty devolves upon a
department commander of supervising the proceedings of regimental and garrison
courts-martial transmitted to his headquarters ...if he discovers a material error,
defect, or omission, he should bring the same to the attention of the proper inferior
commander, and if such error is a fatal defect, such inferior commander should
issue an order declaring the sentence void. But if such error is not a fatal defect,
such inferior commander can remit the unexecuted punishment." 35 Ops. JAG 174,
Feb. 1874; DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912, Discipline, sec. XVI F. Moreover, in 1945 The
Judge Advocate General stated, "When the results of trial by special court-martial
have been promulgated and the record of trial forwarded by the reviewing authority
under the provisions of par. 87 c, MCM, 1928, to the officer exercising immediate
general court-martial jurisdiction over the command, and examination thereof under
the provisions of par. 91, MCM, 1928 discloses that the evidence adduced upon
the trial was legally insufficient to sustain the findings of guilty, or that the record
is otherwise legally insufficient to support the findings and the sentence, the officer
exercising s'uch general court-martial jurisdiction has legal authority thereupon
to direct the reviewing authority of such special court to take supplemental or cor-
rective action to vacate the findings of guilty and the sentence." SPJGJ 1943/
19599, 18 Jan. 1945, 4 BULLETIN OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY
9 (1945) (In subsequent notes this bulletin ;vill be cited as "BULL. JAG"). This
last opinion expressly overruled that of 1932 "insofar as it may appear to be in
conflict."
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ing on the face of this very limited record and could not extend to such)
questions as rulings on evidence, the weight or, indeed, the presence of
evidence, or the correctness of the judge's instructions.54 In civil cases the
common law afforded appellate review by bill of exceptions to consider errors
as to evidence, instructions, and other phases of the trial. At the time the
alleged error was made the injured party would write down the ruling and
pertinent matters and have the writing signed and sealed by the court. "
Bills of exceptions were not permitted in criminal cases. So appellate re-
view in criminal cases was exceedingly limited in scope until the passage of
modern statutes, such as-the English Criminal Appeal Act of 1907.17
The traditions of our military law have been quite different, based as
they are on the Roman civil law with its broad appellate power in the
emperor and even more extensive appellate review by archbishop and pope
in the related canon law system.58 The British Articles of War of 1774 and
the American articles issued prior to 1916 did not specifically require courts-
martial to keep records of their proceedings but the provisions for confirma-
tion and other references in these articles assumed that, by the customs of
the military service, a record would be kept by or under the direction of the
judge advocate.5 9 In fact, the customs of the military service have long re-
54. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 308-313 (1883). See
also ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 22-25 (1939).
5g. ORFIELD, op. cit., note 54, supra, 25.
56. Regina v. Jelly, 10 Cox C.C. 553 (1867).
57. 7 Edw. 7, c. 23.
58. The modem court-martial is descended from the mediaeval English Curia
Militaris or Court of the Constable and Marshal, which consisted of the lord high
constable and the earl marshal, assisted by three doctors of civil law. DAvis, op.
cit., note 1, supra, 13. This court proceeded according to the civil law and from
its judgments an appeal lay to the king in person. 4 COKE, INSTITUTES *123-128;
Parson of Langar v. Conyngsby, SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING'S COUNCIL (Selden
Society) lxxxii, 46 (1361), Rex v. Ramsey, 3 HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS 483 (1631).
See STAT. 13 Ric. 2, c. 2; 4"BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 6%; WINTHROP, Op. Cit.,
note 2, supra, 49; Dean Pound in ORFIELD, op. cit., note 54, supra, 6-7; ORFIELD,
ibid., 20-21; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I 664 (2d ed. 1895); 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
577 (3d ed. 1922); Holdsworth, Martial Law Historically Considered 18 L. Q. REv.
117 (1902).
59. The Articles of War of 1916 provided as follows:
"Art. 33. Records-General courts-martial.-Each general court-martial shall
keep a seperate record of its proceedings in the trial of each case brought before
it, and such record shall be authenticated by the signature of the president and the
judge advocate; but in case the r'ecord can not be authenticated by the judge
advocate, by reason of his death, disability, or absence, it shall be signed by the
president and an assistant judge advocate, if any; and if there be no assistant judge
advocate, or in case of his death, disability, or absence, then by the president and
one other member of the court.
"Art. 34. Records-Special and summary courts-martial.-Each special court-
[Vol. 14
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quired general courts-martial to keep a much more complete record than that
kept by common law criminal courts. It inchides not only the order ap-
pointing the court, the charges, the pleas, the findings and the sentence,
corresponding to the judge's commission, indictment, plea, verdict and
judgment which comprised the common law record, but a complete 'and
accurate record of the proceedings and action of the court at the trial, in-
cluding the organization, challenges, arraignment, testimony of witnesses
and documentary evidence, motions, objections, arguments, rulings 6f the
court on interlocutory questions, adjournments, continuances, and closing
statements-
".. . in short every part. and feature of the proceedings, material,
to a complete history of the trial and to a correct understanding
by the reviewing officer both of the merits of the case and of the
questions of law arising in the course of the investigation. " 6°
The entire testimony of each witness must be given in his own language,
and as nearly verbatim as possible.6 For a judge-advocate to assume to
martial and each summary court-martial shall keep a record of its proceedings,
separate for each case, which record shall contain such matter and be authepticated
in such manner as may be required by regulations which the president may from
time to time prescribe."
The 1920 articles made no substantial change in these articles except to -sub-
stitute the term "trial judge advocate" for judge advocate" and to authorize a
member to replace the president in case of the latter's death, disability or absence.
The 1948 amendments make no change in articles 33 and 34 but they add to article
13 a proviso, "That a bad-conduct discharge shall not be adjudged by a special court-
martial unless a complete record of the proceedings of and testimony taken by the
court is taken in the case." Sec. 210, Selective Service Act of 1948. Presidential
regulations have never required summary courts-martial to record testimony and
they did not require special courts-martial to do so until 1921, since which testimony
before special courts-martial has l4een required either to be reported at length 6r
summarized. Apps. 7, 8, M.C.M., 1917; Apps. 11, 12, M.C.M., 1921; Apps. 7, 8,
M.C.M., 1928.
60. Sec. 2136, DIG. Ops. JAG, 1901. DIG. Ops. JAG, 1880, 412-422; DIG OPs.
JAG, 1895, 639-652; DIG. Os. JAG, 1912, DiscipTe, XIII; WINTHROP, op. cit., note
2, supra, 773-774; M.C.M., 1905, 62; par. 357 and app. 6, M.C.M., 1917; par. 357
and app. 10, M.C.M., 1921; par. 85 b and app. 6, M.C.M., 1928.
61. DIG. Ops. JAG, 1868, 320. MACOMB, PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARuTIAL., § 181
(1841). The form of record given by General Macomb (ibid., p. 102) contemplates
a literal rendering of the exact language of each question and answer. The forms
given by Captain Hough, representating the British practice in India during the
early nineteenth century, omit some of the questions and alter the witness's
langugge so as to make it complete and intelligible without them, thus reducing it
to narrative form. HOUGH, op. cit., note 42, supra, 261-312. Colonel Winthrop takes
issue with Captain Hough on this point. Op. cit., note 2, supra, 784 note. The
Macomb and Winthrop view, that the recording of testimony should be verbatim,
is certainly the American rule. DE HART, OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY LAW 417-418
(1862); M.C.M., 1905, 142-151; par. 250, M.C.M.,,1917; par. 250, M.C.M., 1921;
M.C.M, 1928, 264 note.
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record only such testimony as he considered material, or to summarize the
testimony given, was looked upon as a gross irregularity. Since 1863 there
has been express statutory authority for the employment of a shorthand
reporter, at Government expense, to assist the judge advocate.02 In practice,
a general court-martial trial conducted without a reporter is virtually an
unheard-of procedure.
When the record of a trial by general court-martial is complete it is sub-
mitted to the reviewing authority, that is, the commander who appointed
the court or his successor, without whose approval the court-martial sentence
has no effect. 63 Before acting, that commander undertakes to determine
whether the record discloses that the court was properly constituted and had
jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, that there was at least somhe
evidence of every element of each offense of which the accused was found
guilty, that the sentence is within limits prescribed by statute and presi-
dential regulation, and that there are no errors or irregularities which preju-
dice the substantial rights of the accused. If he determines these items in
the affirmative he may approve the sentence and, if further review is not
required, order its execution.64 But it does not follow that because he has
determined that the record of trial is legally sufficient to support the sen-
tence he must approve the sentence. He is free to iake any one of a number
of other actions and he is not obliged to state any reason for the action he
does take.
62. Sec. 28, act Mar. 3, 1863, 12 STAT. 736; R. S. 1203; Article of War 115
in the codes of 1916 and 1920. No change was made in article 115 by the 1948 amend-
ments. Enlisted men detailed as reporters are entitled to extra pay. Act Aug. 24,
1912, 37 STAT. 575, 10 U.S.C. § 644 (1946); act Aug. 25, 1937, 50 STAT. 805, 10
U.S.C., § 699 (1946).
63. As to who has power to appoint general courts-martial, see note 22, supra.
64. "The proceedings of a court-martial shall not be held invalid, nor the
findings or sentence disapproved, in any case on the ground of improper admission
or rejection of evidence or for any error as to any matter of pleading or pro-
cedure unless in the opinion of the reviewing or confirming authority, after an
examination of the entire proceedings, it shall appear that the error complained of
has injuriously affected the substantial rights of the accused: Provided, That the
act or omission upon which the accused has been tried constitutes an offense de-
nounced and made punishable by one or more of these articles: ... " Article of War
37 in the codes of 1916 and 1920. (In subsequent notes "article of war" will be
abbreviated, "A.W.") No change was made in this article by the amendments of
1948. It merely restates the pre-existing customary military law. WINTHROP, op. Cit.,
note 2, supra, 691-692. It would be very difficult to operate the court-martial
system if insubstantial errors were not overlooked, as prescribed by A.W. 37, es-
pecially in view of the well-settled rule of military law that failure of the defense
to object to incompetent evidence does not cure the error of ieviewing it. As to this
rule, see CM 178446 (1927), DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912-1940, § 395 (2); CM ETO 4756, 4
BULL. JAG 173 (1945).
[Vol. 14
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The reviewing authority may disapprove the sentence in whole or in
part. Disapproval of the entire sentence may be based upon a determination
that the record of trial is not legally sufficient to support the sentence, upon
the reviewing authority's own views as to the weight or credibility of the
evidence or the fairness of the trial,65 or upon matters dehors the record
such as facts disclosed by the preliminary investigation, 6 the results of psy-
chiatric examination of the accused, inquiry into the family background,
civilian career and military record of the accused,' 7 or that the time the
accused has spent in confinement already is adequate punishment for the
offenses of which he was found guilty. The reviewing authority may dis-
approve part of the sentence because he determines that it exceeds the max-
imum limit of punishment set by statute or presidential order for the of-
fenses which the record is legally sufficient to establish."8 For example, if
65. For an interesting discussion of the extent to which the reviewing authori-
ty should weigh evidence, see Connor, Reviewing Authority Action in Court-Mar-
tial Proceedings, 12 VA. L. REv. 43. 54-60 (1925). Colonel Connor seemed to feel
that the reviewing authority should consider the question of whether the evidence
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as if he were the trial court, that is,
without giving any substantial weight to the findings of guilty of the court-martial,
which actually saw and heard the witnesses. The official view would give at least some
weight to the court-martial's findings. DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912, Discipline, XIV E 8
a (1); note 129, infra.
66. A preliminary investigation prior to trial by general court-martial has
been required by statute since 1916. A.W. 70 in the codes of 1916 and 1920; A.W.
46b in the code of 1948. The report of investigation is attached to the record of
trial and submitted with it to the reviewing authority. Par. 357 b 56, M.C.M., 1921.
67. It is customary for the reviewing authority to interview the accused, or
have a staff officer do so, before acting on the record, and to have an investigation
made into the past life and activities of the accused. This affords a more adequate
basis than the record alone for determining such questions as whether the accused is
susceptible of rehabilitation for military service and so should be confined in a
military institution providing training for that purpose or whether he is a hopeless
incorrigible who should be sent to a civilian penitentiary. Psychiatric examination
is customary when the possibility of mental disorder is indicated.
68. For certain offenses the articles of war have set mandatory punishments
which a court-martial can neither increase or decrease. For example, under the
codes of 1916 and 1920, spies must be sentenced to death and officers guilty of
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman must be sentenced to dismissal,
no more and no less. A.W. 82, 95. For other offenses the articles have prescribed a
mandatory minimum punishment, with authority in the court-martial to impose
more. For example, under the codes of 1916 and 1920 an officer found drunk on
duty in time of war or a commanding officer who makes a private profit from pro-
visions supplied his command must be dismissed and inay be sentenced to additional
punishment. A.W. 85, 87. As to most offenses, the articles leave the punishment
to the discretion of the court-martial. This discretion is limited in two respects.
First, the articles of war have always contained provisions prohibiting certain
punishments. The American articles have always prohibited the imposition of
the death penalty unless authorized by the article of war creating the offense.
Art. LI of 1775; Art. 3, sec. XVIII, of 1776; Art. 24, sec. XIV, of 1786; Art. 87
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the court-martial has imposed ten years' confinement for grand larceny and
wilful disobedience of an officer, five years' being the maximum confinement
imposable for-either offense alone, and the reviewing authority determines
that the record is legally sufficient to establish guilt of only one of these
offenses, he will disapprove at least five years of the sentence. He may also
disapprove part of the sentence because, as a matter of discretion, he deems
it excessive. Disapproval of part of a sentence is, of course, impossible when
the only punishment is by nature indivisible, such as death, dismissal, dis-
honorable discharge, reprimand or to make an apology. 9
If the reviewing authority finds in the record a defect which the court
can correct he may return the record to the court-martial which tried the
case for proceedings in revision. For example, where a witness for the prose-
cution was in fact sworn at the trial but the record fails to state that fact,
the court-martial can reconvene, correct its record to show the true facts,
and resubmit the record. New evidence may not be received in revision
proceedings, the record may not be corrected to show the happening of an
event which did not take place, and, of course, such defects as illegality in the
constitution or composition of the court or lack of jurisdiction of the person
or offense cannot be corrected by this means.70 Prior to 1920 the reviewing
authority could also return the record to the court for proceedings in revision
with a view to.reconsidering an acquittal, reconsidering findings of not guilty
of some of the offenses charged, or increasing the sentence.7 He could not,
of 1806; Art. 96 of 1874; Art 43 of 1916, 1920 and 1948. Art LI of 1775 prohibited
more than thirty-nine lashes; Art. 3, sec. XVIII, of 1776 and Art. 24, sec. XIV, of
1786 prohibited more than 100 lashes; and Art. 87 of 1806 prohibited more than
fifty lashes. Act Aug. 5, 1861, 12 STAT 316, and Art. 98 of 1874 prohibited flogging.
Act June 6, 1872, 17 STAT. 259, and act Feb. 18, 1875, 18 STAT. 316, prohibited
branding, marking and tattooing. Art. 41 of 1916 and 1920 prohibited flogging,
branding, marking and tattooing. Art. 97 of 1874 and Art. 42 of 1916 and 1920 pro-
hibit confinement in a penitentiary except for civil offenses for which a civil court
could sentence to a penitentiary. Art. 41 of 1920 prohibits cruel and unusual punish-
,ments.
Second, from 1890 to 1920 the President was empowered by statute to pre-
scribe maximum limits of punishment in time of peace and since 1920 he has had
power to do so in time of war also. Acts Sept. 27, 1890, 26 STAT. 491; Oct. 1, 1891,
26 STAT. 648; A.W. 45 of 1916, 1920. The current limitations are set out in par. 104,
M.C.M., 1928.
69. WI THRoP, op. cit., note 2, supra, 685-694; DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912, Discipline,
XIV. A.W. 47 of 1916, 1920 and 1948 provides that the power to approve a
sentence includes power to disapprove the whole or any part.
70. WINTHROP, op. cit., note 2, supra, 694-702; par. 352, M.C.M., 1917; pars.
352, 372, M.C.M., 1921; par. 83, M.C.M., 1928.
71. MAcOMB, op. cit., note 61, supra, pars. 155, 156; DIG. OPs. JAG, 1912,
Discipline, XIV E, E 4a; CRowDER, MILITARY JusTcE DURING THE WAR, 32-34
(1919). The existence of this power was questioned and its exercise severely critized.
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of course, force the court to make findings of guilty or to increase its sentence
'and he could not change the findings or increase the sentence himself.72
Prior to 1920 the reviewing authority could not, incident to disapproval of a
sentence, order a new trial without the consent of the accused. 7" This meant
that if prejudicial error not correctible by revision proceedings was com-
mitted at the trial, the accused went free, regardless of how apparent his
guilt might be.
If the court-martial finds the accused guilty of an offense and the re-
viewing authority determines that the record of trial is not legally sufficient
to support a conviction of that offense but is legally sufficient to support
findings of guilty of a lesser included, offense, he may return the record to the
court for proceedings in revision, with a view to changing its findings and
sentence accordingy.74 'The 1916 Articles of War empowered the reviewing
authority to make such changes himself, by approving only so much of the
findings as involves guilt of the lesser offense and only so much of the sen-
tence as is appropriate to the lesser offense.75 For example, if the court-
martial finds the accused guilty of murder and sentences him to confinement
for life and the reviewing authority determines that the record of trial is
legally sufficient only to establish manslaughter, he may approve only so
much of the findings as involves guilt of manslaughter and only so much of
the sentence as involves confinement for ten years. As might be expected,
since 1916 revision proceedings have not ordinarily been used to correct er-
rors of this type.
Having approved some or all of a general court-martial sentence, the
See, for example, Bruce, Double Jeopardy and Courts-Martial, 3 MINN. L. REV.
484-509 (1919). It had advantages. For example, if an accused was charged with the
murder.of A, the evidence showed that he shot at B, intending to kill him, but the
bullet struck and killed -A, and the court, because of a mistaken belief that intent to
kill the person who is killed is essential to murder, acquitted or found the accused
guilty of manslaughter only, .the reviewing authority could return the record to the
court with correct advice as to the law and it could reconsider its findings in the light
of this advice. Connecticut and Vermont permit the prosecution to appeal from ajudgment of acquittal in a criminal case with a view to reversal and a new trial.
ORFIELD, op. cit., note 54, supra, 69-72. The United States Supreme Court has held
that such an appeal is not a denial of due process of law. Kepner v. United States, 195
U. S. 100 (1904). The American Law Institute favors allowing such appeals. 12 PRo-
CEEDINGS 207 (1935); Official Draft, Administration of the Criminal Law § 13 (1935).
72. DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912, Discipline, XIV E 1, E 2.
73. 1 Ops. Atty. Gen. 233 (1818); WINTHROP, op. cit., note 2, supra, 693; DIG.
Ops. JAG, 1912, Articles of War, C I I A.
74. DIG. Ors. JAG, 1912, Discipline, XIV E 1.
75. A.W. 47, effective Aug. 29, 1916. A.W. 47 of 1920 and A.W. 47 f of 1948
(sec. 223, Selective Service Act of 1948) confer the same power.
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xeviewing authority may, if he has power to order the execution of the ap-
proved portion of the sentence, mitigate or remit the whole or any part of a
sentence not extending to death or the dismissal of an officer. 0 Under the
codes of 1806, 1874, 1916 and 1920 he could suspend the execution of a sen-
tence to death or dismissal until "the pleasure of the President be known."1 7
Remission is the forgiving of all or part of a sentence. Mitigation involves re-
duction of the punishment in quantity or quality without change in its general
nature. It does not include commutation, that is, change in the nature of the
punishment. So if the sentence is to -confinement at hard labor for six months
the reviewing authority can remit three months of the punishment or mitigate
it to hard labor without confinement but he cannot commte it to a flogging.1
Prior to 1914 a reviewing authority could not suspend the execution of
a sentence except in the narrow case just mentioned."' Since then, a review-
ing authority with powei to order the execution of a sentence has had au-
thority, at the time of approval of the sentence, to suspend the execution,
in whole or in part, of any such sentence as does not extend to death, and
to restore the person under sentence to duty during such suspension. 80 In
practice, suspension of the entire sentence and'restoration to duty are not
very common. Where a soldier has been sentenced to dishonorable discharge
and confinement for a term of years and the reviewing authority thinks there
is a possibility of his rehabilitation, it is usual to suspend the execution of
so much of the sentence as involves dishonorable discharge until the soldier's
release from confinement and to designate a military institution as the place
of confinement. If the accused responds well to disciplinary training the dis-
honorable discharge can, as a matter of clemency, be remitted and he can
be restored to duty as a soldier.
The action of the reviewing authority is attached to the record of trial
and authenticated by his sign manual.s When the reviewing authority (and
76. A.W. 89 of 1806; sec. 2, act July 2, 1864, 13 STAT. 356; A.W. 112 of 1874;'
A.W. 50 of 1916 and 1920; A.W. 51 a of 1948, Appendix, infra. 'f. A.W. LXVII
of 1775 (note 10, supra) and A.W. 2, sec. XVIII of 1776.
77. A.W. 89 of 1806; A.W.111 of 1874; A.W. 51 of 1916 and 1920. This power is
withdrawn by the 1948 amendents because no fieldi commander has power under them
to order the execution of sentences of death or dismissal. A.W. 48, note Appendix,
infra.
78. WiNTrop, op. cit., note 2, supra, 715-728; pars. 380-384, M.C.M., 1921;
par. 87b, M.C.M., 1928.
79. DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912, Discipline, XIV A 4 e.
80. Act April 27, 1914, 38 STAT. 351; A.W. 52 of 1916 and 1920; A.W. 51a
of 1948, Appendix, infra.
81. DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912, Discipline,, XIV c, E 9 1, E 9 m; par. 87b, M.C.M.,
1928.
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confirming authority, in cases where confirmation is required) has taken
final action in a case, the result is announced in published orders.8 2 Prior to
such publication or official notification to the accused, the reviewing author-
ity may revoke or modify his action.83 After such publication or notification
he could not, prior to 1920, recall or modify his action unless the proceedings
were void and subject to collateral attack,'as when the court-martial lacked
jurisdiction of the person or subject matter or the sentence was not one
authorized by law. Therefore, after the publication, of an order approving a
sentence and ordering it executed there was no remedy for non-jurisdictional
errors except executive clemency.84
If the reviewing authority publishes an order announcifg an acquittal
or announcing his disapproval of a sentence~the case is at an end, whether or
not an approved sentence in the case would have required confirmation by
superior authority, and the record of trial is transmitted to The Judge Advo-
cate General for filing.85 If the reviewing authority approves a sentence
which requires confirmation by superior authority, the record of trial is for-
warded to the confirming authority. With respect' to that portion of the
sentence which the reviewing authority has approved, the confirming author-
ity could, under the codes of 1806, 1874, 1916 and 1920, take any action
which a reviewing authority with power to order the execution of the sen-
82. WINTHROP, op. cit., note 2, supra, 733-734; par. 87 d, M.C.M., 1928.
83. Sec. 2235, DIG. Ors. JAG, 1901; DIo. O's. JAG, 1912, Discipline, XIV E
9 e; par. 87 b, M.C.M., 1928.
84. Secs. 2235-2237, DIG. Oss. JAG, 1901; DIo. Ors. JAG, 1912, Discipline
XIV H 1, XV E 4, XV I 3, I 4. "After the reviewing authority has acted on a
case and his action has been promulgated in orders it is too late to urge that the
sentence is invalid on account of weight of evidence, credibility of witnesses, or
any other matter calling for the exercise of judgment or discretion on the part
of the court or reviewing authority." Ibid., XV I 4. "here, after the reviewing
commander had approved a sentence in general orders and the court had been
dissolved, it was discovered that there was a fatal defect in the proceedings, held
that the commander would properly issue a supplemental order declaring the pro-
ceedings a nullity and the original order inoperative and withdrawn on account of
the defect." Ibid., XV E 4. Clemency is -not an adequate substitute for reversal of
a conviction because the conviction still stands. For example, conviction of desertion
in time of war entails loss of citizenship and all rights to pensions. Mere remission
of the punishment imposed by the sentence does not restore citizenship or pension
rights, R. S. 1998, sec. 1, act Aug. 22, 1912, 37 STAT. 356, 8 U.S.C. § 11 (1946), 34
U.S.C. § 1200 (1946).
85. DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912, Discipline, XIV E 9 b (1). "Where the original re-
viewing officer disapproves a sentence, to the execution of which the confirmation of
superior authority is made requisite by the articles of war . . . the sentence being
nullified in law, there remains nothing for the superior authority to act upon . .."
Ibid. If errors are discovered in such a record upon examination in the Office of
The Judge Advocate General, The Judge Advocate General may, of course, write
the reviewing authority a letter of advice for guidance in future cases.
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tence could take.8 6 As an aspect of the constitutional power to pardon, the
President, when acting as confirming authority, has the additional authority
to commute a sentence, that is, to change its nature, as from death to life
imprisonment or dismissal to a reprimand. 7 If the reviewing authority ap-
proves a sentence which he has power to order executed and does order its
execution, the record of trial is transmitted to The Judge Advocate General
for "revision. ' 'ss
Thus, prior to World War I, the general court-martial records which
reached the War Department were of three types:
First, those where the reviewing authority or field confirming authority
had announced an acquittal or disapproval of the sentence. As to these, re-
view by the Judge Advocate General could not be directed toward affecting,
.the result.
Second, those where the reviewing authority had approved a sentence
requiring confirmation by the President or where the President, having ap-
pointed the court-martial, was himself the reviewing authority. There was
no legal requirement that the Judge Advocate General review these records
prior to approval or confirmation by the President but it came to be cus-
tomary for him to do so.8 9
Third, those where a field commander had already ordered the execu-
tion of the sentence.
As to cases of the second type, those requiring approval or confirmation
by the President, if the Judge Advocate General reviewed them prior to
86. Ses. 2040, DIG. Ops. JAG, 1901; DIo. Ops. JAG, 1912, Discipline, XIV H 1;
A.W. 49 of 1916, 1920 and 1948.
87. Sec. 348, DIG: OPs. JAG, 1901; Ex parte WELLS, 18 How. 307 (U. S. 1855).
A.W. 50 of 1920 authorized the President to empower certain field commanders to
commute sentences in specified cases. A.W. 49 of 1948 empowers any confirming
authority to commute; but no field commander is a confirming authority under the
1948 amendments (Appendix, infra.).
88. R.S. § 1199, act June 23, 1874, 10 U.S.C. § 62 (1946).
89. In the case of Major Runkle the Secretary of War, purporting to act for
the President, confirmed a sentence of dismissal, apparently without reference to
the Judge Advocate General. The accused then complained to the President, who
directed the Judge Advocate General to review the record and submit an opinion.
The opinion was to the effect that: the record of trial was not legally sufficient to
support some of the findings but the President (Grant) took no action. Runkle v.
United States, 122 U. S. 543 (1886). During World War I such records were re-
viewed by the Judge Advocate General and sent thereafter through the Adjutant
General and the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War for presentation to the
President. CROWDER, op. cit., note 71, supra, 48-49. Judge Advocate General Swaim
seems to have suggested that review of the record by the Judge Advocate General,
prior to confirmation by the President, was required. Swaim v. United States, 28
Ct. C1. 173, 211-212 (1893).
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action by the President he could, of course, consider anything which the
President as reviewing or confirming authority might consider and submit
an opinion recommending appropriate action. This would constitute appel-
late review of broad scope by an officer learned in the law. In eases of the
third type, where a field commander had already ordered the execution of
the sentence, and those of the second type where the President had already
acted, the possibilities of corrective action by the Judge Advocate General
were narrowly limited. If, in his opinion, the proceedings were absolutely
void for want of jurisdiction he could advise the authority who ordered the
execution of the sentence to announce that fact in orders and to treat the
accused accordingly. If in his opinion there were errors, irregularities or un-
fairness in the proceedings of non-jurisdictional type, all he could do was rec-
ommend clemency since, as has been seen, a reviewing or confirming author-
ity could not revoke his approval of a sentence, once publishedso For ex-
ample, if in a murder case the Judge Advocate General found no evidence
whatever of the corpus delicti, all he could do was recommend a pardon or
remission of the unexecuted portion of the sentence.91 Clemency could do
nothing for an accused who had already been hanged or flogged under an un-
just sentence. Neither a pardon nor remission can restore an officer already
dismissed to his place in the Army.9 2
Although it has been contended that the statutory duty of the Judge
Advocate General to "revise" the proceedings of courts-martial included
power to vacate approved sentences, rfo such power was ever exercised.93
Until 1920 the opinions of the Judge Advocate General were merely advisory;
neither the President nor a field commander was obliged to conform to them.
During World War I, field commanders refused to follow the advice of the
Judge Advocate General in 3.3 per cent of the cases in which he recom-
mended modification or disapproval on legal grounds and the President re-
fused to follow 2.2. per cent of like recommendations made to him.
94
90. DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912, Discipline, XIV B, H 5, F 1; see note 84, supra.
91. DIG. OPs. JAG, 1912, Discipline, XV F 1.
92. Ibid., XV I 2, I 2 A; WINTHROP, op. cirt., note 2, supra, 1161-1169; see
Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 381 (U.S. 1866); United States v. Corson, 114 U. S.
619, 621 (1885). "No officer of the Army who has been or may be dismissed from
the service by the sentence of a general court-martial, formally approved by
the proper reviewing authority, shall ever be restored to the military service,
except by a reappointment 'confirmed by the Senate." R.S. § 1228, 10 U.S.C.
§ 579 (1946), based on act July 20, 1868, 15 STAT. 125.
93. The duty was imposed by see. 5, act July 17, 1862, 12 STAT. 598, note
32, supra, and continued by R. S. § 1199, 10 U.S.C. § 62 (1946), which is still in
force. The contention mentioned in the text was denied in Ex parte Mason, 256
Fed. 384 (C.C.,N.D. N. Y. 1882). See CROWNER, op. cit., note 71, supra, 49-62.
94. CRoWDER, op. cit., note 71, supra, 9, 49.
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The appellate review provided by American military law before World
War I displays two marked deficiencies: First, that no review, by an officer
learned in the law was required in most" cases until after irreparable harm
could be done to the accused and that, in the cases where timely review by
an officer learned in the law was afforded, his opinion was merely advisory.
Second, that the appellate review afforded was by officers-the President, the
commanding general of the army in the field, commanders of territorial de-
partments, army corps, divisions and the like-whose other duties were so
onerous as to preclude their having the time requisite for careful examination
of records of trial. The effect of this second deficiency was that, if there was
any careful review of the record at all, it was not done by the statutory re-
viewing or confirming authority himself but by some subordinate of doubtful
experience and wisdom.9 5
THE WORLD WAR I DEVELOPMENT
The declaration of war of April 6, 1917 had the effect of empowering
commanding generals of territorial departments and divisions to confirm and
execute sentences involving dismissal of officers below the grade of brigadier
general and death sentences in cases of murder, rape, mutiny, desertion and
spying without prior review of the records of trial by the Judge Advocate
General. By general order of December 29, 1917 the War Department
directed such confirming authorities to defer publication of the confirmation
of any death sentence and execution of the sentence until the record of trial
had been reviewed in the office of the Judge Advocate General and the con-
firming authority had been informed by the Judge Advocate General that
such review had been made and that there was no legal objection to carrying
95. The President acted as confirming authority in 1,316 general court-martial
cases during World War II. The writer was Staff Judge Advocate of Headquarters
Command, United States Forces, European Theater, an organization charged with
the discipline of some 30,000 troops and 4,000 American civilians, in 1946. Special
and summary courts-martial of this command tried as many as ninety cases a day.
Three general courts-martial, sitting continuously, completed the trial of twelve
to fifteen cases a month. One record of trial alone, that of Colonel Jack W. Durant,
Air Corps, charged with larceny of jewels from Kronberg Castle, contained over
2600 pages of testimony and took the vriter six weeks to examine. While few
general court-martial records are that large, many are long and difficult. It is mani-
fest that neither the President nor the commander of such a command can, con-
sistently with his other duties, devote enough personal attention to each court-
martial record to constitute satisfactory appellate review. As to who has power to
appoint general courts-martial, see note 22, supa.
96. A.W. 48 of 1916, note 40, supra.
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the sentence into execution. 97 This order purported to vest genuine judicial
power in the Judge Advocate General: his opinion that a record of trial was
not legally sufficient to support the sentence would be more than merely
advisory; it would be a bar to execution of the sentence.
The order remained in effect for only a month, being superseded on
February 1, 1918 by a more comprehensive order of the same type. This
required the commanding general of a territorial department or division who
confirmed a sentence involving death or the dismissal of an officer, and any
reviewing authority who approved a sentence involving dishonorable dis-
charge of an enlisted man without suspending the execution of the dishonor-
able discharge until the soldier's release from confinement, to defer publica-
tion of his action and execution of the sentence uhtil the record of trial had
been reviewed in the office of The Judge Advocate General or a branch there-
of "and its legality there determined."981 The same order established a Branch
Office of the Judge Advocate Gereral in France under an "Acting Judge Ad-
vocate General," to operate under the Judge Advocate General, not under
any overseas commander. 9 The order provided for extension of its provi-
sions to the commanding general of the army in the field (General Pershing).
Unlike the order of December 29, 1917, the order effective February 1, 1918
did not give the Judge Advocate General judicial power. Under the later
order his opinions were merely advisory. A reviewing or 6onfirming authority
could and sometimes did order the execution of a sentence despite the opinion
of the Judge Advocate General or the Acting Judge Advocate General in
France that the record of trial was not legally sufficient to support the sen-
tence.10 The order was changed on this point in September 1918 by an
amendment requiring overseas confirming and reviewing authorities to fol-
97. Sec. I, G.O. 169, W.D. '"Vhenever, in time of war, the commanding gen-
eral of a territorial department or a territorial division confirms a sentence of death,
the execution of such sentence shall be deferred until the record of trial has been
reviewed in the office of the Judge Advocate General and the reviewing authority
has been informed by the Judge Advocate General that such review has been made
and that there is no legal objection to carrying the sentence into execution. The
general court-martial order publishing the result of the trial shall recite that the
date for the execution of the sentence will be hereafter fixed and published in
general orders; and the fixing of the date of execution and the publication thereof
shall follow the receipt of advice from the Judge Advocate General that there is no
legal objection to the execution of the sentence."
98. Sec. I G.O. 7, W.D., Jan. 17, 1918. The order is printed at length in
App. 20, M.C.M., 1917, corrected reprint edition of Aug. 1, 1918.
99. Sec. II, ibid. See note 38, supra.
100.. Note 94, supra.
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low the advice of the Acting Judge Advocate General in France.'' To facili-
tate the review of records of trial under these orders the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral established boards of review, composed of officers of the Judge Advocate
General's Department, in his office and its branch in France, with duties "in
the nature of those of an appellate tribunal.' 10 2
The officer strength of the Judge Advocate General's Department grew
from 17 to 426 during World War 1103 and the Judge Advocate General was'
accorded the rank of major general.1 0 4 The increase was accomplished chiefly
by the appointment of civilian lawyers as Reserve and temporary officers. An
officer of the department was assigned to the staff of each commander who
had power to appoint general courts-martial and review their proceedings.10S
Although these officers were still nominally the judge advocates of the pre-
revolutionary British system, mere prosecuting officials, they had come in
practice to be staff legal advisers who seldom if ever engaged in the actual
trial of a case. A commander customarily asked the opinion of the judge
advocate on his staff before acting as reviewing or confirming authority on a
record of trial by general court-martial and the judge advocate usually sub-
mitted his views in writing, accompanied by a written review of the evi-
dence. 0 6 Presidential regulations of July 14, 1919 made this custom manda-
tory in all cases.1 7 This development remedied one of the major deficiencies
of the pre-war practice by requiring review of every general court-martial
record by an officer learned in the law before irreparable harm could be done
to the accused.
Two other developments of the World War I period should be noted.
A War Department general order of July 14, 1919 limited the power of re-
101. G.O. 84, W.D., Sept. 11, 1918. General Crowder questioned the legality
of this attempt to confer appellate judicial power by War Department order.
Op. cit., note 71, supra, 56-58.
102. Office Memorandum, J.A.G.O., Aug. 6, 1918; Fratcher, op. cit., note 14,
supra, 12.
103. Fratcher, ibid., 11.
104. Act Oct. 6, 1917, 40 STAT. 411. A capitalized "The" was prefixed to his
title by G.O. 2, W.D., Jan. 31, 1924.' Curiously, the capital "T" is used in four
sections of Title II of the Selective Service Act of 1948, omitted in eight, and used
with respect to the Judge Advocate General's Department in one.
105. Fratcher, op. cit., note 14, supra, 15, note 10.
106. Bogert, Courts-Martial: Criticisms and Proposed Reforms, 5 CORN.
L. Q. 18, 34-35, 43-44 (1919). The instructions issued by the Judge Advocate
General under G.O. 7 of Jan. 17, 1918, stated that the division or department judge
advocate should prepare a review of the evidence in each case by that order. M.C.M.,
1917, corrected reprint ed. of Aug. 1, 1918, 413.
107. Par. 370, M.C.M., 1917, as changed by Changes No. 5, July 14, 1919. The
change was made upon recommendation of the Judge Advocate General. MC.M.,
1921, vi.
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viewing and confirming authorities to return records of trial to courts-martial
for proceedings in revision by prohibiting such return for reconsideration of
an acquittal or a finding of not guilty of an offense, or with a view to increas-
ing the sentence, unless it was less than the mandatory sentence fixed by law
for the offense. "' An act of Congress approved February 28, 1919109 re-
moved the old prohibition on mitigation or remission of sentences to death
and dismissal by authorities other than the President and empowered the
President to authorize the commanding general of the Army in the field or of
a territorial division or department to iaitigate or remit such sentences and
order them executed as mitigated or remitted.
The experience of World War I resulted in general agreement that more
adequate statutory provision for appellate review of general court-martial
cases was desirable. There was disagreement as to the method of review. A
special committee appointed by the American Bar Association to study the
problem failed to reach agreement and its disagreement was reflected at the
annual meeting of the association held in September 1919.110 Senator Cham-
berlain of Oregon introduced a bill which would, in effect, have provided a
form of trial on the common law pattern, with a "judge advocate" of each
general court-martial sitting as a trial judge, empowered to pass finally on
all questions of law arising during the trial and to fix and suspend the sen-
ternce. This bill would have eliminated the reviewing authority entirely. The
judgments of the proposed courts-martial were to be final, not subject to re-
view, except that in cases with sentences involving death, dismissal of an
officer, dishonorable discharge of an enlisted man, or confinement for more
than six months, unless the accused waived review, there was to be review
as to legal sufficiency by a court of military appeals. This court would consist.
of three civilians, appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, with the tenure, pay and retirement rights of United.
States circuit judges.-, A board appointed by the War Department recom-
mended much less sweeping changes. The chief of these was the addition to
the articles of war of provisions authorizing a reviewing or confirming au-
thority to grant a new trial incident to disapproval of the findings or sen-
108. Sec. I, G.O. 88, W.D., July 14, 1919. The change was made upon recom-
mendation of the Judge Advocate General. M.C.M., 1921, v.
109. 40 STAT. 1211; par. 381, M.C.M., 1917, as changed by Changes No. 6,
Oct..29, 1919.
. 110. 5 A.B.A.J. 176 (1919); 44 AM. BAR AssN. REP. 44-61, 70-84 (1919).
For various views on the controversy see CRO0WDER, op. cit., note 71, supra; Ansell,
Military Justice, 5 CoRN. L.,Q. 1 (1919); Bogert, op. cit., note 106, supra.
111. S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.
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tence of a court-martial and empowering the President, upon recommendation
of the Judge Advocate General, to vacate findings of guilty and the sentence
of a general court-martial-and order a new trial or restore rights affected by
the sentence even though the action of the reviewing or confirming authority
had already been published.l11
'On June 4, 1920 Congress erracted a revised code of articles of war which
constituted a compromise between the divergent views on appellate review
but leaned toward preservation of the existing system of military law."", The
new code gave statutory sanction to the already customary distinction be-
tween a judge advocate who is a prosecuting official and one who is legal
adviser on the staff of a reviewing or confirming authority by denominating
one "trial judge advocate" and the other "staff judge advocate.' '1, 4 It im-
posed a statutory requirement that, under regulations to be prescribed by
the President, every record of trial by general court-martial received by a
reviewing or confirming authority be referred by him, before he acts thereon,
to his staff judge advocate or to the Judge Advocate General.""o The presi-
dential regulations issued under this provision have required the staff judge
advocate to prepare a written review of each case, including his opinion as
to the weight of the evidence and any error or irregularity and a specific rec-
ommendation of the action to be taken together with his reasons for such
opinion and recommendation. 1 6 The staff judge advo6ate's review has come,
in practice, to be a rather elaborate document, somewhat more comprehen-
sive than the opinion of a common law court. It contains a statement of the
charges, a complete summary of all the evidence, comment on the weight of
the evidence and every possible error or irregularity, a description of the
112. Proceedings and Report of Special War Department Board on Courts-
Martial and Their Procedure, 3, 30 (1919). The recommendations of this board
were in substantial accord on thesd points with the views of General Crowder.
CROWDER, op. cit., note 71, supra, 64; Articles of War-Comparative Print showing
changes proposed by the Judge Advocate General as Compared with the Changes
Proposed by the Kernan-O'Ryan-Ogden Board and with the Existing Law, Senate
Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess.
113. Sec. 1, Ch. I, act June 4, 1920, 41 STAT. 787, 10 U.S.C. 1472-1593.
(1946). This had been H.R. 12775, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., a bill drafted by General
Crowder and not radically amended in passage. King, The Army Court-Martial
System, [1941] Wis. L. REv. 311-342, is an excellent general description of the
practice under the 1920 Articles of War. See, also, McNeil, United States Courts-
Martial in Britain, 60 L. Q. REv. 356-360 (1944); Saden, Army Justice, 20 CONN.
BAR J. 106-128 (1946); Fratcher, American Military Justice, 2 BULL. ADJ. GEN.
ScH. 13-16, 55-57 (1943).
114. A.W. 11, 17, 46.
115. A.W. 46.
116. Par. 370, M.C.M., 1921; pa?. 87b, M.C.M., 1928.
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civilian background and military record of the accused, the staff judge ad-
vocate's estimation of him based on a personal interview, and a recommenda-
tion of the action to be taken."17 The review is accompanied by a proposed
form of action, prepared for the signature of the reviewing authority. The
reviewing authority is thus enabled to act intelligently in every case, in the
light of his knowledge of the disciplinary problems of the command, without
himself reading all the records of trial.1 18 It is rare for a reviewing authority
to act against the advice of his staff judge advocate on a point of law but he
may do so; that is, the advice of the staff judge advocate is merely that, it is
not judicial action.
The 1920 Articles of War embodied in statute the existing prohibition
on the return of records of trial to courts-martial for proceedings in revision
with a view to reconsideration of an acquittal or findings of not guilty or to
increasing a sentence which was not less than the mandatory sentence fixed
by law.1 0 As has been noted, the 1916 Articles of War had eliminated the
necessity for revision proceedings in cases where the record of trial was not
legally sufficient to establish the offense of which the accused was found
guilty but was legally sufficient to support findings of guilty of some lesser
included offense, by empowering the reviewing authority to make appro-
priate changes in the findings.20 Presidential regulations issued in 1928 made
unnecessary the commonest type bf revision proceedings by authorizing the
officers who authenticated the record of trial (usually the president and trial
judge advocate of the court-martial) to correct clerical errors and omissions
in the record without reconvening the court.' 2' The cumulative effect of
these three changes has been to make revision proceedings relatively rare.
They are occasionally necessary, as in the case where a court-martial imposes
less than the statutory minimum sentence.
117. A sample of the fori of staff judge advocate's review in general use is
set out in App. 2, War Department Technical Manual 27-255, MILITARY JUSTICE
PROCEDURE (1945). The review in the case referred to in note 95, supra, ran to
52 legal cap pages, single-spaced. Four to twelve page reviews are more common.
118. As to the impossibility of his reading every record, see note 95, supra.
119. A.W. 40. The article also prohibits a court-martial making such recon-
sideration or increase on its own motion. It was not changed by the 1948 amend-
ments. It has recently been held that, if the reviewing authority approves the
origihal sentence, but mitigates it, and superior authority directs a rehearing, the
sentence on rehearing may not exceed the original sentence as mitigated. CM 330-
193 (1948), 7 BULL. JAG, 133 (1948). This rule would apply to revision proceedings
as well as rehearings.
120. A.W. 47, 49. Note 75, supra.
121. Par. 87b, M.C.M., 1928.
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It will be recalled that, under the pre-1920 practice, a reviewing or con-
firming authority who found in a record of trial prejudicial error which was
not correctible by proceedings in revision, could do nothing but disapprove
the sentence; he could not order a new trial without the consent of the ac-
cused.1 22 For example, where findings of guilty were based in part upon
consideration of hearsay testimony or an involuntary confession, the accused
went free even though other evidence in the record strongly indicated guilt.
The 1920 Articles of War corrected this weakness by empowering a reviewing
or confirming authority to direct a rehearing incident to disapproving a sen-
tence.128 The rehearing takes place before a court composed of officers not
members of the court which first heard the case. Upon rehearing the accused
may not be tried for any offense of which he was found not guilty by the
first court, and no sentence in excess of or more severe-than the original
sentence may be enforced unless based upon findings of guilty of an offense
not considered upon the merits in the original trial.
With one exception, the 1920 Articles of War made no change in the
existing requirements of confirmation, which had been virtually the same
since the' Civil War.12 4 Sentences involving a general officer, dismissal of an
officer, suspension or dismissal of a cadet, or death required confirmation by
the President before being carried into execution except that, in time of war,
the commanding general of the Army in the field or of a territorial depart-
ment or division could confirm sentences involving dismissal of an officer
below the grade of brigadier general and death sentences imposed for murder,
rape, mutiny, desertion, or spying. The exception referred to was a provision
of the 1920 Articles empowering the commanding general'of the Army in
the field or of a territorial department or division to confirm a sentence
which would otherwise require confirmation by the President if he at the
same time commuted it to a punishment which would not in itself require
presidential confirmation.225 The 1920 Articles provided that the record
of trial' in any case where the sentence' required confirmation by the Presi-
122. Note 73, supra.
123. A.W. 40, 47, 49, 50 Y2. Like provisions are contained in A.W. 47 f (3),
49 e and 52 'of 1948, Appendix, infra.
' 124. A.W. 48,; Note 40, snpra. By Executive Order 9556, May 26, 1945, 3
ConE. FED. REaGs. 70 (Supp. 1945) the President delegated to the Secretary and
Under Secretary of War his powers of confirmation in all except death sentence
cases. This order was issued under Title I, First War Powers Act, 1941 (act Dec.
18, 1941, 55 STA. 838, 50 U.S.C. App. § 601 (1946). See note 26, supra.
125. Par. 3, A.W. 50, 10 U.S.C. § 1521 (1946); "When empowered by the
President so to do, the the commanding general of the Army in the field or thq
commanding general of the territorial department or division, may approve or
confirm and commute (but not approve or confirm without commuting), mitigate,
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dent or where the President had appointed the court-martial should, before
submission to the President for his action, be examined by a board of review
in the office of the Judge Advocate General.126 This board was to consist of
at least three officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department designated
by the Judge Advocate General and was to submit its opinion in writing
to the Judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate General was then tb
transmit the record and the board's opinion, with his own recommendations,
directly to the Secretary of War for the action of the President.
The language of the statute does not appear to make the opinion of the
board of review and the recommendations of the Judge Advocate General in
presidential cases more than advisory; it would seem that the President
could act in disregard of them if he chose to do so. Nevertheless, the Judge
Advocate General ruled, with the concurrence of the Secretary of War, that
when both the board of review and the Judge Advocate General held a record
of trial legally insufficient to support the sentence it should not be sub-
mitted to the Secretary of War for the action of the President but returned
to the reviewing authority for rehearing or other appropriate action. 27 The
effect of this ruling was to vest power in the Judge Advocate General and
the board of review which was judicial, not merely advisory, a distinct change
from the pre-1920 practice. The statute expressly changed the pre-existing
practice-of' submitting opinions of the Judge Advocate General intended for
the President through the Adjutant General and the Chief of Staff by direct-
ing the Judge Advocate General to deal directly with the Secretary of
War.s It was soon determined that the scope of review in presidential cases
or remit and then order executed as commuted, mitigated, or remitted any sentence
which under these articles requires the confirmation of the President before the
same may be executed." Act Feb. 28, 1919, 40 STAT. 1211, had contained a similar
provision, but with "remit or mitigate" instead of "commute."
126. Pars. 1, 2, 6, A.W. 50V2, 10 U.S.C. § 1522 (1946): "The Judge Advocate
General shall constitute, in his office, a board of review consisting of not less than
three officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department.
"Before any record of-trial in which there has been adjudged a sentence re-'
quiring approval or confirmation by the President under the provisions of article
46, article 48, or article 51 is submitted to the President, such record shall be
examined by the board of review. The board shall submit its opinion, in writing, to
the Judge Advocate General, who shall, except as herein otherwise provided, trans-
mit the record and the board's opinion, with his recommendations, directly to the
Secretary of War for the action of the President; "
"Whenever necessary, the Judge Advocate General may constitute two or more
boards of review'in his office, with equal powers and duties."
127. C.M. 154185, Dec. 29, 1922, M.C.M., 1928, App. 1, A.W. 50%, note.
128. This provision became very important in 1942 when The Judge Advo-
cate General and The Adjutant General were placed under a Chief of Administra-
tive Services, who was subordinate to the Commanding General, Army Service
Forces, who in turn was subject to the War Department General Staff.
19491
33
Fratcher: Fratcher: Appellate Review
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
had not been changed by the new articles of war. In passing on records of
trial prior to action by the President the board of review and the Judge
Advocate General could weigh the evidence, judge of the credibility of wit-
nesses, and reach conclusions on controverted questions of fact. The scope
of review was as broad as the presidential power to act and so the same as
that of the staff judge advocate of a reviewing or confirming authority.12 1
As to non-presidential cases, the 1920 Articles of War provided that a
reviewing or confirming authority could not, in a contested case, order the
execution of any general court-martial sentence involving death, dismissal
not suspended, dishonorable discharge not suspended, or confinement in
a penitentiary, prior to review of the record of trial by a board of review
and The Judge Advocate General.30 If the board of review and The Judge
129. C.M. 153479 (1922), see. 408 (1), DiG. Oss. JAG, 1912-1940.
"In accordance with the principle that on the question of credibility, the
findings of the trial court, which enjoyed the opportunity both to see and hear'the
witnesses, while not conclusive, are entitled to considerable weight . . . the
Board of Review attaches some importance to the fact that the court, in this case
has, by its findings, accepted the testimony of the witness Hollister, and rejected
the conflicting testimony of accused. As it is the function of the Board of Review
to weigh the evidence in Presidential cases the position of the Board in such
cases is in some iespects analogous to the position of appellate courts in equity,
where it is generally held that the findings of the trial court, while not conclusive,
are entitled to great respect and deference on appeal." United States v. Calder,
CM¢I 243466, 27 B.R. 365, 382 (1944), 3 BULL. JAG, 231 (1944).
130. Pars. 3, 4, A.W. 50Y2.:
"Except as herein provided, no authority shall order the execution of any
other sentence of a general court-martial involving the penalty of death, dismissal
not suspended, dishonorable discharge not suspended, or confinement in a peni-
tentiary, unless and until the board of review shall, with the approval of the
Judge Advocate General, have held the record of trial upon which such sen-
tence is based legally sufficient to support the sentence; except that the proper
reviewing or confirming authority may upon his approval of a sentence involving
dishonorable discharge or c6nfinement in a penitentiary order its execution if it, is
based solely upon findings of guilty of a charge or charges and a specification or
specifications to which the accused has pleaded guilty. When the board of review,
with the approval of the Judge Advocate General, holds the record in a case in
which the order of execution has been withheld under the provisions of this
paragraph legally sufficient to support the findings and sentence, the Judge Advocate
General shall so advise the reviewing or confirming authority from whom the
record was received, who may thereupon order the execution of the sentence. When
in a case in which the order of execution has been withheld under the provisions of
this paragraph, the board of review holds the record of trial legally insufficient to
support the findings or sentence, either in whole or in part, or that errors of law
have been committed injuriously affecting the substantial rights of the accused, and
the Judge Advocate General concurs in such holding of the board of review, such
findings and sentence shall be vacated in whole or in part in accord with such
holding and the recommendations of the Judge Advocate General thereon, and the
record shall, be transmitted through the proper channels to the convening authority
for a rehearing or such other action as may be proper. In the event that the Judge
Advocate General shall not concur in the holding of the board of review, the
[Vol. 14
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Advocate General agreed that the record of trial was legally sufficient
to support the findings and sentence, the reviewing or confirming authority
could then order the execution of the sentence. If the board of review
and The Judge Advocate General agreed that the record of trial was
not legally sufficient to support the findings or sentence, in whole or in part,
or that errors of law had been committed injuriously affecting the substan-
tial rights of the accused, the sentence should thereby be vacated in whole
or in part. If the sentence was wholly vacated the record should be returned
to the reviewing or confirming authority for proceedings in revision or to
decide whether he wished to order a rehearing or dismiss the case. If the
board of review and The Judge Advocate General did not agree on a case,
the record, with the holding of the board and The Judge Advocate General's
dissent, should be forwarded to the Secretary of War for the action of the
Judge Advocate General shall forward all the papers in the case, including the
opinion of the board of review and his own dissent therefrom, directly to the Secre-
tary Uf War for the action of the President, who may confirm the'action of the
reviewing authority or confirming authority below, in whole or in part, with or
without remission, mitigation, or commutation, or may disapprove, in whole or in
part, any finding of guilty, and may disapprove or vacate the sentence in whole
or in part: Provided, That the functions prescribed in this paragraph to be per-
formed by the President may -be performed by the Secretary of War or Acting Sec-
retary of War: Provided further, That whenever a branch of the office of the
Judge Advocate General is ,established, under the provisions of the last paragraph
of this article, with a distant command, such functions may be performed by the
commanding general of such distant command in all cases in which the board of
review in such branch office is empowered to act and in which the commanding
general of such distant command is not the appointing or confirming authority.
"When the President or any reviewing or confirming authority disapproves or
vacates a sentence the execution of which has not, theretofore been duly ordered,
he may authorize or direct a rehearing. Such rehearing shall take place before a
court composed of officers not members of the court which first heard the case.
Upon such rehearing the accused shall not be tried for any offense of which he was
found not guilty by the first court, and no sentence in excess of or more severe
than the original sentence shall -be enforced unless 'the sentence be based upon a
finding of guilty of an offense not considered upon the merits in the original pro-
ceeding: Provided, That such rehearing shall be had in all cases where a finding
and sentence have been vacated by reason of the action of the board of review
approved by the Judge Advocate General holding the record of trial legally in-
sufficient to support the findings or sentence or that errors of law have been com-
mitted injuriously affecting the substantial rights of the accused, unless, in accord
with such action, and the recommendations of the Judge Advocate General thereon,
the findings or sentence are approved in part only, or the record is returned for
revision, or unless the case is dismissed by order of the reviewing or c nfirming
authority. After any such rehearing had on the order of the President, the record
of trial shall, after examination by the board of review, be transmitted by the
Judge Advocate General, with the board's opinion and his recommendations,
directly to the Secretary of War for the action of the President"
The first proviso to par. 3 was added by act Aug. 20, 1937, 50 STAT. 724, 10
U.S.C. § 1522 (1946); the second proviso by act Aug. 1, 1942, 56 STAT. 732, 10
U.S.C. § 1522 (1946).
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President. The President could then confirm the action of the reviewing or
confirming authority, in whole or in part, with or without remission, mitiga-.
tion, or commutation, or disapprove any finding of guilty in whole or in part,
and disapprove or vacate the sentence in whole or in part. Incident to dis-
approval he could order a rehearing. An amendment of 1937 empowered the
Secretary of War or Acting Secretary of War to perform these functions of
the President- and an executive order of 1943 delegated such power to the
Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of Wfr."12
Under the 1920 Articles of War every other record of trial by a general
court-martial, that is, every non-presidential case which did not require
examination by a board of review before the sentence could be put into
execution, was to be transmitted to the Judge Advocate General for exam-
ination in his office after the sentence was ordered executed.1 3 3 In practice,
such records of trial have normally been examined in the 'Military Justice
Division of the Office of The Judge Advocate General by two officers of the
Judge Advocate General's Department called examiners and the work of
131. Act Aug. 20, 1937, 50 STAT. 724, 10 U.S.C. § 1522 (1946).
132. Exec. Order 9363, July 23, 1943, 3 CODE FED. REGs. 34 (Supp. 1943)
issued under authority of Title I, First War Powers Act, 1941, act Dec. 18, 1941,
55 STAT. 838, 50 U.S.C. App. § 601 (1946). This order also authorized the As-
sistant Judge Advocate General in charge of military justice matters to perform
the functions of The Judge Advocate General in -non-presidential cases.
133. Par. 5, A.W. 50 V2.:
"Every record of trial by general court-martial, examination of which by the
board of review is not hereinbefore in this article provided for, shall nevertheless be
examined in the Judge Advocate General's Office; and if found legally insufficient
to support the findings and sentence, in whole or in part, shall be examined by the
board of review, and the board, if it also finds that such record is legally insuf-
ficient to support the findings and sentence, in whole or in part, shall, in writing,
submit its opinion to the Judge Advocate General, who shall transmit the record
and the board's opinion, with his recommendation, directly to the Secretary of War
for the action of the President. In any such case the President may approve,
disapprove or vacate, in whole or in part, any findings of guilty, or confirm, miti-
gate, commute, remit, or vacate any sentence, in whol6 or in part, and direct the
execution of the sentence as confirmed or modified, and he may restore the ac-
cused to all rights affected by the findings and sentence, or part thereof, held to
be invalid;- and the" President's necessary orders to this end shall be binding upon
all departments and officers of the government: Provided, That the functions pre-
scribed in this'paragraph to be performed by the President may be performed by the
Secretary of War or Acting Secretary of War: Provided further, That whenever a
branch of the office of the Judge Advocate General is established, under
the provisions of the last paragraph of this article, with a distant command, such
functions may be performed by the commanding general of such distant command in
all cases in which" the board of review in such branch office' is empowered to act
and in which the commanding general of such distant command is not the appoint-
ing or confirming authority."
The first proviso was Added by act Aug. 20, 1937, 50 STAT. 724; the second pro-
viso by act Aug. 1, 1942, 56 STAT. 732 10 U.S.C. § 1522 (1946).
[Vol. 14
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these examiners checked by a senior officer called the chief examiner. This
examination has been as thorough and nearly as formal as review by a board
of review except that no written opinion has been prepared unless an ex-
aminer or the chief examiner discovered a prejudicial error or irregularity.
If the record was found legally insufficient to support the findings and sen-
tence, it was to be transmitted to a board of review.134 If the board of re-
view found the record legally sufficient, there was to be no further review;
if the board of review found the record legally insufficient, the Judge Ad-
vocate General was to transmit the record, together with the board's opinion
and his own recommendations, to the Secretary of War. The President or,
since 1937, the Secretary of War,a 5 could then take any of the actions
described in the antepenultimate sentence of the preceding paragraph and
could restore the accused to all rights affected by the findings and sentence,
or part thereof, held to be invalid. It is noteworthy that this is the first
time our military law permitted the vacation of a conviction for non-
jurisdictional error after the action of the authority competent to order the
execution of ihe sentence had been published. In such a case, however, un-
like one reviewed by a board of review before the publication of an order of
execution, the President or Secretary of War could not 'order a rehearing. 13 6
Although it is probable that Congress intended to provide broad appel-
late review of questions of fact in non-presidential cases,137 the 1920 Articles
134. The language of the fifth paragraph of A.W. 50%/, note 133, supra, appears
to be mandatory. If the board of review concurs in a finding of legal insufficiency,
in whole or in part, the Judge Advocate General "skail" transmit the record, etc.
Nevertheless the Judge Advocate General ruled that cases would be forwarded
for corrective action by the President only when (a) all findings of guilty were illegal,
(b) one or more findings of guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude or affecting
civil status were illegal, or (c) restoration of rights, privileges or property vwere
required. In all other cases the old remedy of remission of some or all of the
unexecuted portion of the sentence would be used. JAG, 250.404. (Memorandum
for the Secretary of War, subject: Article of War 50V/z), April 13, 1923. This
application of paragraph 5 was approved by the Secretary of War. The correspond-
ence is reprinted in McNEIL, HISTORY BRANcH' OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL WITH THE UNrrED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATRE, 467-470 (1945).
135. Act Aug. 20, 1937, 50 STAT. 724. These functions also were delegated to the
Under Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of War by Executive Order
9363, note 132, supra.136. SPJGJ 1945/2031, 23 Feb. 1945, 4 BULL. JAG, (1945). "When, however,
the findings and sentence are vacated because the proceedings were void for juris-
dictional reasons, the accused may be tried on the same charges before a properly
constituted court." Ibid.
137. "Experience has also shown that it is essential, in order to enable just
results to be obtained to the greatest possible degree, that the appeal shall include
a review and a correction of errors of fact as well as errors of law, a fact the more
conspicuously true because the procedure before a court-nfartial renders especially
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of War were construed to permit the Judge Advocate General and the board
of review to consider in such a case only the narrow question of whether
there was any substantial evidence of each element of the offense charged.
They might not weigh evidence, judge of the credibility of witnesses, deter-
mine controverted questions of fact, or decide whether an inference which
could have been drawn should have been.1 18 If a board of review held a rec-
ord of trial legally sufficient to support the sentence and the sentence was
ordered executed, the board could not thereafter reconsider the case.189 Con-
versely, if a board of review held a record of trial legally insufficient to sup-
port the sentence and the Judge Advocate General concurred in the holding,
the sentence was at once vacated and the board could not thereafter re-
consider the case. 40
In practice the boards of review have permitted counsel for the accused
to argue cases before them and present briefs in much the same manner
difficult an exact discrimination between findings of fact and rulings upon questions
of law, a discrimination which even in nonmilitary criminal courts has presented
great difficulties; but that the review upon questions of fact should, of course (as
in the equity practice), be restrained by the presumption of the correctness of such
findings as turn upon the credibility of witnesses who are seen and heard by the
lower court, but not by the appellate court."--Articles of War-Comparative Print
showing changes proposed by The Judge Advocate General as Compared with the
Changes Proposed by the Kernan-O'Ryan-Ogden Board and with the Existing Law,
Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 2d Sess.
138. "In cases in which the President is neither reviewing nor confirming autho-
rity, it is not the province of either the Board of Review or The Judge Advocate
General, and neither has the right, to weigh the evidence. In passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence in such cases, it is their province merely to determine
whether or not there is in the record any substantial evidence which, if uncon-
tradicted, would be sufficient to warrant the findings of guilty. It is exclusively
the province of the court-martial, including the reviewing, and if there be one, the
confirming, authority to weigh evidence, judge of its credibility, and determine
controverted questions of fact." CM 145791 (1921), sec. 408 (2), DIG. Ops. JAG,
1912-1940.
"In a case in which the President is neither the reviewing nor the confirming
authority, the Board of Review may not legally weigh evidence to determine whether
or not certain inferences should have been drawn therefrom. It is sufficient if the
inferences drawn by the court could legally have been drawn from the evidence."
CM 161833 (1924), sec. 408 (2), DIG. Os. JAG, 1912-1940.
"In the exercise of its judicial power of appellate review, the Board of Review
treats the findings below as presumptively correct, and examines the record of trial
to determine whether they are supported in all essentials by substantial evidence.
To constitute itself a trier of fact on appellate review, and to determine the proba-
tive sufficiency of the testimony in a record of trial by the trial court standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be a plain usurpation of power and frustra-
tive of justice." CM 192609 (1930), sec. 408 (2), DIG. O's. JAG, 1912-1940.
139. JAG, 210.81, Apr. 24, 1933, sec. 408 (1), DIG. Ops. JAG, 1912-1940 (presi-
dential case); CM 250309, 3 BULL. JAG. 282 (1944) (non-presidential case).
140. CM 196526 (1931), sec. 408 (2), DIG. Oss. JAG, 1812-1940.
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as a common law appellate court. In presidential cases the boards of review
have prepared opinions comparable in form and scope to a staff judge
advocate's review. In non-presidential cases involving a holding of legal
insufficiency or a question of law of some importance, they have prepared
"long holdings" which discuss the problems involved and the precedents
bearing on them and give reasons for the result reached. In non-presidential
cases held legally sufficient in which there is no serious legal question, the
boards have usually prepared only a "short holding," a mere statement that
the record of trial has been examined and found legally sufficient and free
from prejudicial error. Dissenting members of boards may file dissenting
opinions. While not absolutely bound by their own previous decisions, they
have tended to follow the doctrine of stare decisis quite strictly. Their hold-
ings and opinions have been reported at length in a set of reports which
has been given limited circulation but which is available to all parties con-
cerned at principal military headquarters in this country and abroad. Those
of general interest to the service have been published in abbreviated form
in the Digest of Opinions of TLe Judge Advocate General, 1912-1930 and
1912-1940, and in the Bulletin of The Judge Advocate General of the Army,
a periodical published monthly from 1942 to 19-46 and bimonthly since then.
The Digest and the Bulletin have been given wide distribution throughout
the military service and are readily accessible. Holdings and opinions of the
boards of review are cited and used as precedents by military lawyers in the
same way in which decisions of courts of common law and chancery are cited
and used by members of the civilian bar.
One further provision of the 1920 Articles of War requires mention. It
empowered the President, whenever he deemed such action necessary, to
direct the Judge Advocate General to establish a branch of his office, under
an Assistant Judge Advocate General, with any distant command and to
constitute a board or boards of review in such branch office.141 The Assistant
Judge Advocate General and boards of review in a branch office could per-
141. Par. 7, A.W. 5OV2:
"Whenever the President deems such action necessary, he may direct the
Judge Advocate General to establish a branch of his office, under an Assistant Judge
Advocate General, with any distant command, and to establish in such branch office
a board of review, or more than one. Such Assistant Judge Advocate General and
such board or boards of review shall be empowered to perform for that command,
under the general supervision of the Judge Advocate General, the duties which
the Judge Advocate General and the board or boards of review in his office would
otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sentences not
requiring approval or confirmation by the President."
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form for the distant command the functions which would otherwise be per-
formed by the Judge Advocate General and boards of review in his office
in cases not requiring action by the President. An amendment of 1942 pro-
vided that, in cases of disagreement between the Assistant Judge Advocate
General and a board of review, the functions which would be performed by
the President or the Secretary of War in cases of disagreement between The
Judge Advocate General and a board of review could be performed by the
commanding general of the distant command, unless he was the reviewing
or confirming authority.. 42 This provision made it possible to carry into
execution in an overseas command in time of war all sentences except those
which required presidential confirmation, that is, those respecting a general
officer, extending to dismissal or suspension of a cadet, and those involving
death imposed wholly or in part for an offense other than murder, rape,
mutiny, desertion or spying.14 3
The provision mentioned in the preceding paragraph was not used until
1942. During World War II branch offices of The Judge Advocate General
were established with the European Theater of Operations, the North African
(later Mediterranean) Theater of Operations, the China-Burma-India The-
ater of Operations, and the United States Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean
Area.. The commander of each of these theaters was designated a "command-
ing general of the Army in the field," with power to confirm sentences of dis-
missal of officers and death sentences imposed exclusively for murder, rape,
mutiny, desertion and spying. Toward the end of the war, when the great
bulk of our land and air forces was in these overseas theaters, most of the
work of appellate review of records of trial by general courts-martial was
performed in the branch offices of The Judge Advocate General. 44 The proce-
142. Act Aug. 1, 1942, 56 STAT. 732, 10 U.S.C. § 1522 (1946). The text is set
out in notes 130 and 133, supra.
143. A theater commander could not confirm a death sentence based on findings
of guilty of murder, rape, mutiny, desertion or spying and some other offense
punishable by death. For example, a death sentence imposed for misbehavior be-
fore the enemy and desertion could not be confirmed by the theater commander and
required review by a board of review in Washington and The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral and action by the President. CM 274990, 4 BULL. JAG, 275 (1945). During
World War II no commander except the President acted as confirming authority
within the continental limits of the United States, the territorial departments and
divisions no longer forming part of our domestic military organization.
144. During the month of June 1945 the Branch Office of The Judge Advocate
General with the European Theater of Operations received 1731 records of trials
by general courts-martial and completed the review of 1698. Of these 1698 records,
409 were examined by a board of review, including some which had been examined
in the Military Justice Division and there found legally insufficient, McNEiL, op. cit.,
note 134, s"pza, 6. There were three boards of review sitting in the office at the
[Vol. 14
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dure followed in the branch offices was the same as that in the Office of The
Judge Advocate General with one exception. Death and dismissal cases were
presidential confirmation cases in Washington and,' hence, examined by a
board of review and The Judge Advocate General before transmission to the
President. That being so, the type of review given them was of the broad
type, including weighing of evidence and judging the credibility of witnesses.
Overseas, however, records of trial involving sentences to death or dismissal
did not reach the branch office of The Judge Advocate General until after
confirmation by the theater commander. In consequence, they were accorded
the narrow form of review used in the main office in non-presidential cases.' 45
This disparity of treatment was counteracted in large measure by the fact
that such records were given review of the broad type by the overseas The-
ater Judge Advocate prior to confirmation. 46
THE 1948 AMENDMENTS TO THE ARTICLES OF WAR
The system of appellate review established by the 1920 Articles of War
worked smoothly under the pressure of World War II. It did not require
major changes during the war, as had been the case during the Civil War
and World War I. The records of the more than 88,000 trials by general
courts-martial held during the war were examined for legal sufficiency by
officers learned in the law in the office and branch offices of The Judge Ad-
vocate General, far removed from the pressure of combat and the influence
of field commanders. There has been relatively little complaint as to the
operation of the system so far as determination of the legal sufficiency of
records of trial is concerned. That is to say, there is little contention that
many innocent men were punished or guilty men denied the forms of law
and a proper trial. -
There has been criticism of the operation of the system of military
justice in World War II, to some extent justified, on the ground that the
sentences imposed were sometimes unduly severe and that there were gross
beginning of that month and five at the end. Ibid., 45. There were then 36 officers
on duty in the office, one of whom was assigned to administrative dutieg. The re-
maining 35 officers constituted, in effect, a very large and very busy appellate court,
sitting in sections.
145. United States v. Pepper, CM ETO 1631, 20 May 1944, 1 DIG. OPs.
BOTJAG ETO 200 (1945); McNEIL, op. hit., note 134, supra, 83-93.
146. The Theater Judge Advocate was an officer of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department on the staff of the theater commander, whereas the Assistant
Judge Advocate General in charge of a branch office of The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral was responsible directly to The Judge Advocate General and was not subject to
the theater commander.
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inequalities in standards of punishment as between commands and as be-
tween officers and enlisted men. 47 The evil, so far as it existed, was due in
part to the system and in part to the way in which it was operated. The
sentence of a court-martial is determined by the court, subject to the re-
strictions imposed by the articles of war and limitations upon maximum
punishments imposed by the President.14 These restrictions and limitations
leave a wide field for the operation of the court's discretion, notably in the
case of the commonest military offense, absence without leave, which was
punishable during the war by anything short of death.140 As has been seen,
reviewing and confirming authorities have always had power to remit and
mitigate and, since 1914, to suspend sentences, in whole or in part, incident
to approving or confirming them.150 The staff judge advocate of a tactical
division sees all the general court-martial records which arise in the division,
advises the division commander as to the exercise of these powers which he
has as reviewing authority, and so is in a position to secure a reasonable
degree. of equality of punishment for like offenses within the division. His
judgment as to the propriety of a sentence is necessarily influenced to some
extent by the pressure of combat and the views of his commander. More-
over, he does not know what is being done in like cases in other commands
similarly situated.
Exact equality of punishment for like, or superficially like, offenses as
between commands is by no means desirable. A command suffering from an
epidemic of barracks thefts must stamp it out with punishments more
severe than would be warranted in a command where such offenses are rare.
A command engaging in combat or about to do so properly considers absence
without leave in a much more serious light than a command performing
garrison duty in peaceful territory. A command whose men operate bombing
planes should punish drunkenness on duty more severely than a command
whose men collect garbage and dig ditches. But some measure of equality
of punishment between commands is requisite to justice. If, when two divi-
147. Holtzoff, Administration of Juastice in the United States Army, 22 N. Y.
U.L.Q. REv. 1, 8-10 (1947).
148. See note 68, supra.
149. The limitations on punishments for absence without leave were suspended
by Executive Order 9267, Nov. 9, 1942, 3 CODE FED. REGS. 1225 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
They were restored by Executive Order 9683, 19 Jan. 1946, 3 CODE FED. REGS. 88
(Supp. 1946), and Executive Order 9772, Aug. 24, 1946, 3 CODE FED. Rmos. 159
(Supp. 1946). The limitations were too strict for wartime (3 days' confinement for
each day's absence up to 60 days; 6 months confinement for more than 60 days'
absence) but .the President might well have imposed some limitations.
150. Notes 76, 80, supra.
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sions have similar missions and disciplinary situations, one habitually pun-
ishes for a week's absence without leave by confinement for six months.and
the other by confinement for thirty years, corrective action is indicated.
The only agencies which see all the records of trials by general courts-
martial from different commands are the Office of The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral and its overseas branches. Under the 1920 Articles of War neither The
Judge Advocate General nor anyone in his office or its branches had power
to mitigate, remit, commute or suspend sentences. Their powers of appellate
review were limited to determining" the legal sufficiency of records of trial
and did not extend to modifying sentences which were within legal limits.
After a reviewing authority had acted, power to mitfgate, remit and suspend
the sentence was vested in the commander exercising court-martial jurisdic-
tion over the place where the accused was confined, superior commanders,
the Secretary of War and the President, none of whom saw or had custody
of the record of trial.151 Equalization of sentences and the extension of
clemency were handled by The Adjutant General, perhaps as a carry-over
from the period before 1849 when he reviewed and filed court-martial records.
In Washington there was cooperation between the offices of The Ad-
jutant General and The Judge Advocate General and the latter always felt
free to make recommendations for modifications of sentences suggested by
review of records of trial in his office. A large measure of equalization of
sentences between commands located within the continental limits of the
United States was secured during World War II through the sending by
The Adjutant General, under authority of the Secretary of War, of letters
to all domestic reviewing authorities suggesting appropriate punishments
for the more common offenses."1 2 In overseas commands, however, the matter
was left to the theater commanders on the theory that they were in the
best positions to know the disciplinary needs of their commands. In the
European Theater, the Assistant Judge Advocate General in charge of the
Branch Office of The Judge Advocate General 5 3 suggested the promulgation
by the Theater Commander of a policy for equalization of sentences and
151. A.W. 50, 10 U.S.C. §1521 (1946); A.W. 52, as amended by act Dec. 15,
1942, 56 STAT. 1051, 10 U.S.C. § 1524 (1946); A.W. 53, 10 U.S.C. § 1525 (1946).
152. Ltr. AGO, file AG 250.4 (2-12-43) OB-S-SPJGJ-M, subject: Uniformity of
sentences adjudged by general courts-martial, Mar. 5, 1943; ltr, AGO, file AG 250.4
(16 May 45) OB-S-USW-M, subject: Uniformity of Sentences Adjudged by General
Courts-martial, 18 May 1945.
153. Brigadier General Edwin C. McNeil, B.S., United States Military Academy,
1907; LL.B., Columbia, 1916; Graduate, Army War College, 1923; .Executive to the
Staff Judge Advocate, A.E.F., France, during World War I.
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offered to assist in the program by making recommendations as to modifica-
tions of sentences incident to appellate review of records of trial. The
Theater Commander replied, in effect, that he would not promulgate such
a policy and did not want recommendations from the Assistant Judge Ad-
vocate General looking toward equalization of sentences. Thereafter the
Assistant Judge Advocate General made such recommendations to The Judge
Advocate General and a policy of equalization was carried out by boards
operating under the Under Secretary of War.154 The practical result was
that each record of trial was reviewed twice, first in Paris for legal sufficiency
and again in Washington for propriety of sentence, an unnecessary duplica-
tion of effort.
Another source of inequality arose from the fact that some sentences
required confirmation by the President, some by a theater commander, and
some required none. If two men ran away in battle under similar circum-
stances, one was charged with desertion and the other misbehavior before
the enemy (they being equally appropriate charges under those circum-
stances), and both were sentenced to death, the sentence for desertion could
be confirmed and carried into execution by the theater commander; that
for misbehavior required *confirmation by the President. Similarly, if an
officer and an enlisted man participated together in, the commission of a
crime in this country, say embezzlement, under circumstances of equal guilt,
and the officer was sentenced to dismissal and five years' confinement and
the enlisted man to dishonorable discharge and five years' confinement, the
officer's sentence required confirmation by the President; that of the enlisted
man could be carried into effect by the reviewing authority after review by
a board of review and The Judge Advocate General as to legal sufficiency
only. During World War II the President was more lenient than most re-
viewing and confirming authorities. He tended to suspend the execution of
sentences of dismissal of officers in cases of first offenders where military
commanders would not do so. This disparity of treatment was probably
indicative of the difference between the civilian and the military viewpoint:
the civilian concentratng attenton on the officer being punished; the military
on the danger and unfairness of placing in command of men, with the enor-
mous power and influence which that entails, officers who had demonstrated
tendencies toward crime or instability. The difference in attitude between
the President, who acted finally on officer cases, and field commanders, who
154. McNEIL, op. cit., note 134, supra, 295-325, 512-521, 525-533.
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acted finally on the cases of enlisted men, tended to foster an impression
that the system of military justice dealt more harshly with enlisted men
than with officers.1zs
Early in 1946 the Secretary of War appointed an advisory committee,
whose membership was nominated by the American Bar Association, to study
the administration of military justice and recommend as to changes."M  The
committee held a number of hearings and rendered a report in December
1946.157 The committee rejected the suggestion, which had again been ad-
vanced, for appellate review of court-martial proceedings by a civilian court
of appeals."5 8 It recommended that general courts-martial be appointed and
their proceedings be reviewed by field representatives of The Judge Advocate
General, normally the staff judge advocates of field armies. The commanders
who now appoint such courts (notably commanders of field armies, army
corps, tactical divisions and independent brigades) would retain only au-
thority to direct the trial of charges, designate trial judge advocates, and
mitigate, suspend or set aside sentences. 59 To the end that officers of the
Judge Advocate General's Department might have sufficient independence
to perform these functions properly, the committee recommended certain
155. See Wiener, The Court-Martild System, 60 INFANTRY J. 31, 36-37 (1947).
156. Memorandum No. 25-46, W.D., 25 Mar, 1946. The chairman of the
committee was Dean (now Chief Justice) Arthur T. Vanderbilt.
157. Report of War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice, 13
December 1946. A summary of the report was published in 33 A.B.A.J. 40-41, 92
(1947).
158. Ibid., Part II, par. I. The proposal for review of court-martial proceedings
by the civil courts has been raised and rejected in Great Britain also. See Griffith-,
Justice and the Army, 10 MoD. L. Ray. 292-303 (1947).
The civilian court of appeals proposal was revived by H.R.. 5675 and H.R.
6612, 79th Congress, 2d Session, which would establish a five judge civilian court,
directed to examine the record and hear "any additional evidence" as to every
Army and Navy general court-martial case in which a sentence was rendered during
World War II (H.R. 5675 excepted presidential cases), and authorized to review
sentences of special, summary and deck courts. The court was to complete its work
by December 31, 1950. The impracticability of this proposal is manifest when it is
noted that, if the court succeeded in disposing of 25 cases a week, it would take some
70 years to complete the review of the Army general court-martial cases alone.
S. 1160, 80th Congress, 1st Session, would have empowered United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals to review general court-martial cases.
By vesting appellate judicial functions in the senior officers of the Judge Advo-
cate General's Department, the existing system of military justice ensures, so far
as possible, that they will be performed by persons with long and intimate exper-
ience with military law. That its judges were selected from among experienced
leaders of the bar was one of the greatest sources of strength of the English com-
mon law system. It would be difficult to devise a system of review by civilian
courts of appeals which would preserve this advantage of the present court-martial
system.
159. Report cit. note 157, supyra, part II, pars. 6, 7.
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changes in their status.160 The committee recommended that all records of
trials by general courts-martial continue to be reviewed in the office or a
branch office of the Juage Advocate General and that cases in which dis-
honorable discharge is suspended. be reviewed in the same way as are cases
in which it is not suspended. It suggested that the article of war governing
such review be rewritten for clarification and said,
"This reviewing authority shall have the power to review
every case as to the weight of the evidence, to pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the record and to mitigate, or set aside, the sentences
and to order a new trial. This recommendation relates not only to
checking command control but also importantly to the correction
of excessive and fantastic sentences and to the correction of dis-
parity between sentences.''
The War Department accepted the committee's recommendations as to
appellate review in the Office of The Judge Advocate General and its branches
with the qualification that the powers of mitigation and remission should be
exercised by The Judge Advocate General under the direction of the Secre-
tary or Under Secretary of War. The Department did not accept the com-
mittee's recommendations for appointment of courts-martial and review of
their pioceedings by field representatives of The Judge Advocate General or
for special separate status for officers of the Judge Advocate General's De-
partment.16 2
After extensive House of Representatives committee hearings the Con-
gress- enacted a number of amendments to the 1920 Articles of War, to
become effective February 1, 1949,163 In general, these amendments reflect
the views of the War Department, except that the status of tlie Judge Ad-
160. Ibid., par. 8. Something like this proposal has been adopted in Great-
Britain, where the appointment and supervision of the Judge-Advocate-General
have been transferred from the Secretary of War to the Lord High Chancellor. 45 -
P. RL. DEBATES (COMMoNs) - (Sept. 21, 1948).
161. Ibid., par. 5.
162. Memorandum of the Secretary of War, Feb. 20, 1947, 33 A. B. A. J. 319-
322 (1947). See also, Royall, Revision of the Military Justice Process as Proposed
by the War Department, 33 VA. L. REv. 269-88 (1947).
163. Title II, Selective Service Act of 1948, approved June 24, 1948, Pub. L.
759, 80th Congress. A bill containing the same provisions (H.R. 2575) had been
passed by the House but action on it by the Senate seemed hopeless. The provisions
were proposed from the floor of the Senate as an amendment to the Selective Service
Bill by Senator James P. Kern of Missouri, whose vigorous support was probably
responsible for the enactment of the measure. 94 CONG. REc. 7747-7762 (June 9,
1948). For a pungent discussion of this legislation, see Wiener, The New Articles
of War, 63 INFATrwy J. 24-31 (1948). The articles which govern appellate review
are printed in the Appendix, infra.
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vocate General's Department and its officers is changed slightiy more than
the Department favored. They change the name of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department to Judge Advocate General's Corps.16 The list of com-
manders with power to appoint general courts-martial and 'review their
proceedings is changed slightly, but the power is still vested in commanders,
not in field representatives of The Judge Advocate General. 1 5 Convening
(i.e., appointing and reviewing) authorities are directed to communicate
directly with their staff judge advocates in matters relating to the admin-
istration of military justice.161 This has long been the procedure in most
commands although, in a few, the staff judge advocate was allowed to com-
municate with the commander only through the chief of staff or an assistant
chief of staff. Apart from this, there is no material change in the relation
between a reviewing authority and his staff judge advocate, that is, the
recommendations of the staff judge advocate are still merely advisory and
need not be followed, even on questions of pure law. 16 7 The new articles
of war do not change the functions or powers of the reviewing authority.'
They do include an admonition to him which merely puts in statutory form
pre-existing customary military law:
164. Secs. 223, 246-249. The changes in the status of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department are, in general, beyond the scope of the present article. It should
be noted, however, that the act provides that officers shall be permanently ap-
pointed in the Judge Advocate General's Corps-of the Regular Army by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent'of the Senate (sec. 246). This restores the
procedure followed from 1862 to 1947. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 provided
that a person entering the Regular Army with a view to judge advocate duties
should be appointed in the Army at large and merely assigned by military orders
to the Judge Advocate General's Department. Under this arrangement, known
as the "detail" syetem, a career lawyer could be transferred to a non-legal branch
of the Army without his own consent or that of the Senate and officers with no legal
training could be assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Department without
the consent of the Senate. Sec. 502, act Aug. 7, 1947, 61 STAT. 883, 10 U.S.C. § 506
(Supp. 1947). This "detail" system has long been in use in the Navy, with the
result that the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and his staff have often been
officers without legal training and trained lawyers have been shifted back and forth
from sea duty to legal work. This same "detail" system has been adopted for the
Air Force by the act of June 25, 1948, Public Law 755, 80th Congress, which provides
for a Judge Advocate General of the Air Force and sets up a system of military
justice for the Air Force. It is to be hoped that the Air Force will adopt a policy
of having legal work done only by trained lawyers permanently assigned to legal
duties.
165. Note 22, supra.
166. A.W. 47 a, Appendix, infra.
167. A.W. 47 c, Appendix, infra. The language of the statute is not as clear
on this point as would be desirable. It might be contended that the "found legally
sufficient" refers to a finding by the staff judge advocate or The Judge Advocate
General.
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a... no sentence shall be approved unless upon conviction estab-
lished beyond reasonable doubt of an offense made punishable by
these articles, and unless the record of trial has been found legally
sufficient to support it.''168
The 1948 Articles create a new form of punishment for enlisted men,
the "bad-conduct discharge," which is intended to be less severe than a dis-
honorable discharge. It may be imposed by either a general or a special
court-martial. If imposed by a special court-martial there must be a com-
plete record of the proceedings and testimony, the sentence requires ap-
proval by a commander exercising general court-martial jurisdiction, the
record of trial must be reviewed by the staff judge advocate of the command
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction before his commander acts, and
the record receives appellate review in the Office of The Judge Advocate
General or one of its branches. 1 69
Under the new articles action by the convening authority (i.e., as re-
viewing authority) niay be taken by an officer commanding for the time
being, by a successor in command, or by any officer exercising general court-
martial jurisdiction. °0 This provision was designed to cover the situation,
common in World War II, where a command is inactivated or sails over-
seas while a record of trial is being typed.
Apart from the minor changes mentioned, initial appellate review by
the reviewing authority and his staff judge advocate remains under the 1948
amendments as it was under the 1920 Articles of War.
With respect to appellate review in the Office of The Judge Advocate
General the 1948 Articles of War make much more extensive changes. Every
record of trial by general court-martial must still be reviewed in that office.
The amended articles retain the boards of review established by the 1920
Articles and create a new appellate tribunal in the Office of The Judge Ad-
vocate General, the Judicial Council, which is to consist of three general
officers of the'Judge Advocate General's Department (Corps) designated by
The Judge Advocate General.171 The new articles make no distinction be-
tween war and peace as to the requirement and power of confirmation.
They require confirmation by the President as a prerequisite to the execu-
tion of any sentence of death or involving a general officer and do away with
168. A.W. 47 c, Appendix, infra.
169. A.W. 13; A.W. 36; A.W. 47 c, d, Appendix, infra.
170. A.W. 47 d, e, Appendix, infra.
171. A.W. 50 a, b, Appendix, infra.
[Vol. 14
48
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1949], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss1/7
APPELLATE REVIEW IN MILITARY LAW
the former powers of confirmation of the commanding general of the Army
in the field and the commanding generals of territorial departments and
divisions. Sentences involving imprisonment for life, dismissal of an officer
below the grade of brigadier general, or dismissal or suspension of a cadet
of the United States Military Academy require confirmation by the Judicial
Council, with the, concurrence of The Judge Advocate General, or, in the
event of their disagreement, by the Secretary of the Army. Other sentences
do not require confirmation unless The Judge Advocate General or a board
of review deems modification of the findings of guilty or the sentence neces-
sary to the ends of justice or The Judge Advocate General does not concur
in a holding of a board of review that a record of trial is legally insufficient.
In such cases, confirmation by the Judicial Council alone is sufficient, unless
The Judge Advocate General has directed that his participation in the con-
firming action is required or the action of the Judicial Council is not unan-
imous. In these last events, confirmation by the Judicial Council, with the
concurrence of The Judge Advocate General, is required, or, in the event
of their disagreement, by the Secretary of the Army.1" 2
These changes in the location of authority to confirm eliminate one of
the chief sources of disparity in sentencing policy which existed under the
1920 Articles of War. All death sentences and all sentences'affecting general
officers require confirmation by the President under the new articles. All
other sentences may be confirmed in the Office of The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral or one of its branches. The Judge Advocate General will be able to
maintain uniformity of policy within his office and as between it and its
branches.
The new statute provides that power to confirm a sentence includes
power to approve, confirm, or disapprove a finding of guilty, and to approve
or confirm so much only of a finding of guilty of an offerise as involves a
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense; to confirm, disapprove, vacate,
commute, or reduce to legal limits the whole or any part of the sentence;
to restore all rights, privileges, and property affected by any finding or sen-
tence disapproved or vacated; to order the sentence to be carried into execu-
tion; and to direct a rehearing.173 This list of powers of a confirming author-
ity differs in three respects from the former powers of, confirming authorities.
First, power to commute sentences is extended to confirming authorities other
than the President. Second, power to remit, mitigate and suspend sentences
172. A.W. 48, Appendix, infra.
173. A.W. 49, Appendix, infra.
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is not included in the list. Third, power to direct a rehearing is conferred
even in cases where an order directing the execution of the sentence has
already been issued by a field reviewing authority. The new articles pro-
vide that the power of the President, the Secretary of the Army and any
"reviewing authority" to order the execution of a sentence shall include
power to mitigate, remit, or suspend the whole or any part thereof, except
that a death sentence may not be suspended- 74 Although it is not wholly
clear from the context, it would seem that the term "reviewing authority,"
as used in this provision, does not include the Judicial Council acting as a
confirming authority. The Judge Advocate General is empowered,, incident
to review of- the record of trial in his office, to remit, mitigate or suspend
any sentence which does not require approval or confirmation by the Presi-
dent, but the power to remit or mitigate is to be exercised by The Judge
Advocate General under the direction of the Secretary of the Army.717
Records of trial in presidential cases, that is, those involving death sen-
tences and sentences affecting general officers, upon arrival in the Office of
The Judge Advocate General, are to be examined by a board of review. If
the board of review holds that the record is legally insufficient to support
the findings of guilty and sentence, or the sentence, or that errors of law have
been committed injuriously affecting the substantial rights of the accused,
and The Judge Advocate General concurs in the holding, the findings and
sentence are thereby vacated and the record of trial is to be returned to the
reviewing authority for a rehearing or such other action as may be proper.170
This constitutes clear statutory sanction for the practice followed under the
ambiguous provision of the 1920 Articles of War on this point. If, in a presi-
dential case, the board of review is of the opinion that the record of trial is
legally sufficient or The ,Judge Advocate General does not concur in the
board's holding of legal- insufficiency, the record of trial and the board's
opinion go to the Judicial Council. If the Judicial Council holds the record
legally insufficient and The Judge Advocate General concurs, the findings and
sentence are thereby vacated and the record of trial is to be returned to the
reviewing authority for rehearing or other appropriate action. If the Judicial
Council is of the opinion that the record of trial is legally sufficient or The
Judge Advocate General does not concur in the Council's holding of legal
insufficiency, the record of trial, the opinions of the board of review and the
174. A.W. 51 a, Appendix, infra.
175. Ibid.
176. A.W. 50 d (3), Appendix, infra.
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Judicial Council, and The Judge Advocate General's recommendations go to
the Secretary of the Army for the action of the President.'17
Records of trial in non-presidential confirmation cases, that is, those
involving sentences' to imprisonment for life, dismissal of an officer below
the. grade of brigadier general, tor dismissal or suspension bf a cadet, upon
arrival in the Office of The Judge Advocate General, are to be examined by
a board of review. If the board finds the record legally insufficient and The
Judge Advocate General concurs, the findings and sentence are thereby va-
cated, as in a presidential case. If the board of review is of the opinion
that the record is legally sufficient or The Judge Advocate General does not
concur in its findings of legal insufficiency, the record of trial goes to the
Judicial Council for confirming action. If The Judge Advocate General con-
curs in the confirming action of the Judicial Council, that action becomes
effective, whether it involves disapproval of the sentence, modification of the
sentence, or execution of the sentence as pronounced. If The Judge Advocate
General does not concur in the confirming action of the Judicial Council,
the record of trial goes to the Secretary of the Army for confirming action.178
As under the 1920 Articles of War, a reviewing authority may not order
the execfition of a sentence involving dishonorable discharge not suspended
or confinement in a penitentiary prior to examination by a board of review.
The new arti~cles add sentences to bad-conduct discharge not suspended to
the category of cases requiring appellate review by a board of review prior
to being put in execution. Moreover, as suggested by the War Department
Advisory Committee, the new articles require examination by a board of
review of all cases involving suspended sentences to dishonorable or bad
conduct discharge. These are reviewed after the reviewing authority has
promulgated his action in orders. He may not vacate the suspension prior
tb such review. If, in a case of any of these types, the board of review holds
the record of trial legally insufficient, and The Judge Advocate General con-
curs, the sentence is thereby vacated and the record of trial is returned to
the reviewing authority for rehearing or other appropriate action. If the
board of review holds the record of trial legally sufficient and does not deem
modification of the findings of guilty or the sentence necessary to the ends
of justice, and The Judge Advocate General concurs, no further action is
required. If the reviewing authority has not already ordered the execution
of the sentence, he may do so. If the board of review finds the record of trial
177. A.W. 50 d (1), Appendix, infra.
178. A.W. 50 d (2), (4); A.W. 48 b, c, Appendix, infra.
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legally insufficient and The Judge Advocate General does not concur or if
either the board or The Judge Advocate General deem modification of the
findings of guilty or the sentence necessary to the ends of justice, the record
goes to the Judicial Council for confirming action. In this class of cases the
confirming action of the Judicial Council is effective without more unless
the Council is not unanimous or The Judge Advocate General has directed
his own participation in the confirming action. In these events, the con-
firming action of the Judicial Council is not effective 'unless The Judge Advo-
cate General concurs and, if he dQes not concur, the record of trial goes to
the Secretary of the Army for confirming acti6n.1 9
Every other record of trial by general court-martial is to be examined
in the Office of The Judge Advocate General and if found legally insufficient
to support the findings of guilty and sentence, in whole or in part, is to be
transmitted to a board of review for treatment like that accorded records
dealt with in the preceding paragraph."1 0 This means that the Military
Justice Division of the Office of The Judge Advocate General still has a place
in the system of appellate review. That place will be, however, much smaller
than it has been heretofore, because the great bulk of its work has been the
examination of records of trial involving suspended sentences to dishonorable
discharge. These require examination by a board of review under the new
articles.18'
The new articles provide explicitly that, in the appellate review of rec-
ords of trials by courts-martial, The Judge Advocate General and all appel-
late agencies in his office shall have authority to weigh evidence, judge ,the
credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact."'
This means that the scope of review in all cases will now be that accorded
presidential cases under the 1920 Articles of War."13
The 1948 Articles contain a provision, similar to that of the 1920 Arti-
cles, authorizing the establishment of a Branch Office of The Judge Advocate
179. A.W. 50 e; A.W. 48 b, c, d, Appendix, infra.
180. A.W. 50 f; A.W. 51 b, Appendix, infra.
181. Some very severe sentences can still' be carried into effect without exam-
ination of the record of trial by a board of review either before or after they have
been ordered executed. This would be so in the case of a civilian newspaper corres-
pondent sentenced to confinement for 80 years in an institution other than a peni-
tentiary, an officer sentenced to suspension from rank, command and pay for ten
years, or an officer sentenced to forfeit half his pay for the remainder of his natural
life.
182. A.W. 50 g, Appendix, infra.
183. See note 129, supra.
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General, under an Assistant Judge Advocate General, with any distant com-
mand. The Assistant Judge Advocate General in charge of such a branch
office and the boards of review and Judicial Council in it are empowered to
perform for the distant command in non-presidential cases, under the gen-
eral supervision of The Judge Advocate General, the functions which The
Judge Advocate General and the boards of review and Judicial Council in
his office would otherwise perform. The Assistant Judge Advocate General
is required to be a general officer of the Judge Advocate General's Depart-
ment (Corps). Under this provision it will be possible to carry into execu-
tion in an overseas theater, without reference to Washington, any sentence
which does not involve death or affect a general officer.18 4
The statute contains a proviso that the power of mitigation and remis-
sion of sentences shall not be exercised by an Assistant Judge Advocate
General in charge of a branch office or by agencies in his office, but that he
may make recommendations as to mitigation and remission to The Judge
Advocate General.'-s The Judge Advocate General is empowered to remit,
mitigate and suspend sentences in non-presidential cases, after they have
been ordered executed, but he is to exercise this power under the direction
of the Secretary of the Army.186 The result of these provisions is that the
Assistant Judge Advocate General in charge of a Branch Office of The Judge
Advocate General with an overseas theater will not be able to establish or
carry out a program of equalization of sentences for that theater but that,
unless the Secretary of the Army objects, The Judge Advocate General will
have power to establish and carry out such a program on an Army-wide
basis. As suggested before, such an arrangement involves duplication of
effort, in that the overseas records of trial are examined twice,, once in the
overseas theater to determine legal sufficiency and again in Washington to
determine the propriety of the sentence. However, there may be advantages
to having equalization of sentences carried out on an Army-wide rather than
a theater-wide basis and The Judge Advocate General will be able to reduce
the burden of double examination by promulgating general sentencing poli-
cies and relying on his branch offices' recommendations as to their applica-
tion to particular cases. The chief disadvantage is that, if sentences are not
reduced to proper shverity before they are given publicity, the public is likely
184. A.W. 50 c, Appendix, infra.
185. Ibid.
186. A.W. 51 b, Appendix, infra.
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to get the impression, prevalent during World War II, that the military
justice administered in overseas theaters is harsh and unduly severe.
It will be recalled that, under the 1920 Articles of War, the boards of
review aid The Judge Advocate General could not reconsider their holdings
aid opinions after they had been acted upon.1 7 It followed that there was
no remedy except executive clemency for a serious mistake in the process
of appellate review or in case of the discovery of new evidence indicating
that a conviction constituted a miscarriage of-justice. The new articles of
war authorize The Judge Advocate General, under such regulations as the
President may prescribe, and upon good cause shown, in his discretion to
grant a new trial, or to vacate a sentence; restore rights, privileges, and prop-
erty affected by the sentence, and substitute for a dismissal, dishonorable
discharge, or bad conduct discharge already executed a form of discharge
implying no dishonor. This power is to be exercised upon application of the
accused made within one year after final disposition of the case upon initial
appellate review.88 The statute aoes not impose the limitations which apply
to rehearings1 9 upon the new trials authorized by this provision. Therefore
it would seem that, on such a new trial, the accused might be found guilty of
an offense of which he was acquitted at the first trial and given a more severe
sentence than that originally imposed. It is probable that the presidential
regulations will prohibit this. 90
The changes made in the system of military justice in 1862, 1920 and
1948 have given increasing influence and control, through the process of ap-
pellate review, to persons learned in the law who devote their full time to
legal work. All lawyers will agree that this increase is desirable, so far as it
is consistent with the efficient performance of the Army )s primary mission
of winning battles. All lawyers are not agreed that, under the law as it will be
on February 1, 1949, the Army's appellate judges, the officers of the Judge Ad-
vocate General's Corps, will have tenure secure enough and freedom from
187. Note 138, supra.
188. A.W. 53, Appendix, infra. Applications with regard to World War II
cases may be made within one year after the termination of the war.
189. Cf. A.W. 52, Appendix, infra. See note 119, supra.
190. Presidential regulations prescribing the rules of evidence in trials by courts-
martial, details of procedure, and maximum punishments are promulgated by ex-
ecutive order and published in the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U. S. ARMY. A
1949 revised edition of this manual, enlarged and largely rewritten under the direc-
tion of The Judge Advocate General, designed to implement the amended articles of
war, is in process of publication.
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pressure sufficient to ensure that they will be completely independent and
fearless in the discharge of their judicial duties.191 Although lawyers may
differ on this question they may well agree that the Congress has been wise
in entrusting appellate judicial review of court-martial proceedings to offi-
cers learned in military law rather than to judges whose background and
training are wholly civilian.192 By so doing it has ensured the administration
of military justice by men who understand the peculiar needs of the Army
and who will not import into military law procedures developed in the civilian
courts which are not suited to the military situation. Under the officers of
the Judge Advocate General's Corps our military law, like the common law,
will continue to be a gradually developing system, adapting itself steadily to
new conditions and needs of the military service.
191. See Courts-Martial Reform Has Been Delayed, 34 A.B.A.J. 702 (1948);
Objects to Editorial on Military Justice, 34 A.B.A.J. 1142 (1948).
The merits of the controversy on this question are beyond the scope of
the present article. It may be noted, however, that one ground for complaint
as to the status -of the officers of the Judge Advocate General's Corps is that a
career officer of the Corps, until he completes twenty years' service, may be
summarily discharged from the Army and denied retirement benefits with-
out charges, hearing or even a statement of the cause of discharge. After com-
pletion of twenty years' service he is entitled to limited retirement benefits in the
event of such summary removal. In either case the removal is effected through 'the
action of a board of officers which need not include any lawyer in its membership,
which can act in secret, and which need not confront the officer concerned with
the evidence against him or give him a chance to rebut it. Secs. 507, 509, 514, act
Aug. 7, 1947, 61 STAT. 883, 10 U.S.C. §§ 511, 513, 518 (Supp 1947). In consequence
his tenure has less legal protection than that of a civil servant and, of course, far less
than that of a federal judge. In the past the War Department has used such sta-
tutory summary removal procedures with care and restraint. It is probable, there-
fore, that the tenure of an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps will be
more secure than the statute appears to make it.
192. See A.W. 50 h, A.W. 53, Appendix, infra. The writer hopes to supplement
the present article with a study of the extent to which the Federal civil courts have
been willing to review court-martial cases through the medium of habeas corpus
proceedings. This problem raises interesting questions of policy and of interpretation
of the Federal Constitution. See Lieber, The Supreme Court on the Military Status,
31 AM. L. REv. 342-362 (1897); Collateral Attack on Courts-Martial in the Federal
Courts, 57 YALE L. J. 483.489 (1948).
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APPENDIX
ARTICLES OF WAR GOVERNING APPELLATE REVIEW AS AMENDED BY
TITLE II. SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1948
(PUBLIC LAW 759, 80TH CONGRESS)
"ART. 47. Action by Convening Authority.-
"a. Assignment of judge advocates; channels of communication.-All
members of the Judge Advocate General's Department will be assigned as
prescribed by The Judge Advocate General after appropriate consultations
with commanders on whose staffs they may serve; and The Judge Advocate
General or senior members of his staff will make frequent inspections in the
field in supervision of the administration of military justice. Convening
authorities will at all times communicate directly' with their staff judge ad-
vocates in matters relating to the administration of military justice; and
the staff judge advocate of any command is authorized to communicate
directly with the staff judge advocate of a superior or subordinate command,
or with The Judge Advocate General:
"b. Reference for trial.-Before directing the trial of any charge by
general court-martial the convening authority will refer it to his staff judge
advocate for consideration and advice; and no charge will be referred to a
general court-martial for trial unless it has been found that a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof has been made as prescribed in the preceding
article, that such charge is legally sufficient to allege an offense under these
articles, and- is sustained by evidence indicated in the report of investigation.
"c. Action on record of trial-Before acting upon a record of trial by
general court-martial or military commission, or a record of trial by special
court-martial in which a bad-conduct discharge has been adjudged and ap-
proved by the authority appointing the court, the reviewing authdrity will
refer it to his staff judge advocate or to The Judge Advocate General for
review and advice; and no sentence shall be approved unless upon convic-
tion established beyond reasonable doubt of an offense made punishable by
these articles, and unless the record of trial has been found legally sufficient
to support it.
"d. Approval.-No sentence of a court-martial shall be carried into
execution until the same shall have been approved by the convening au-
thority: Provided, That no sentence of a special court-martial including a
bad-conduct discharge shall be carried into execution until in addition to
the approval of the convening authority the same shall have been approved
by an officer authorized to appoint a general court-martial.
"e. Who may exercise.-Action by the convening authority may be
taken by an officer commanding for the time being, by a successor in com-
mand, or by any officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction.
, "f Powers incident to power to approve.-The power to approve the
sentence of a court-martial shall include-
"(1) the power to approve or disapprove a finding of guilty and to
approve only so much of a finding of guilty of a particular offense
as involves a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense;
"(2) the power to approve or disapprove the whole or any part of the
sentence; and
"(3) the power to remand a case for rehearing under the provisions of
article 52."
"ART. 48. Confirmation.-In addition to the approval required by
article 47, confirmation is required as follows before the sentence of a court-
martial may be carried into execution, namely:
[Vol. 14
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"a. By the President with respect to any sentence-
"(1) of death, or
"(2) involving a general officer: Provided, That when the Presi-
dent has already acted as approving authority, no additional
confirmation by him is necessary;
"b. By the Secretary. of the Department of the Army with respect
to any sentence not requiring approval or confirmation by the President,
when The Judge Advocate General does not concur in the action of the
Judicial Council;
"c. By the Judicial Council, with the concurrence of The Judge Ad-
vocate General, with respect to any sentence-
"(1) when the confirming action of the Judicial Council is not unan-
imous, or whe by direction of The Judge Advocate General his
participation in the confirming action is required, or
"(2) involving imprisonment for life, or
"(3) involving the dismissal of an officer other than a general officer, or
"(4) involving the dismissal or suspension of a cadet;
"d. By the Judicial Council with respect to any sentence in a case
transmitted to the Judicial Council under the provisions of article 50 for
confirming action."
"ART. 49. Powers Incident to Power to Confirm.-The power to con-
firm the sentence of a court-martial shall be held to include-
"a. The power to approve, confirm, or disapprove a finding of' guilty,
and to approve or confirm so much only of a finding of guilty of a particular
offense as involves a finding of guilty. of a lesser included offense:
"b. The power to confirm, disapprove, vacate, commute, or reduce
to legal limits the whole or any part of the sentence;
"c. The power to restore all rights, privileges, and property affected
by any finding or sentence disapproved or vacated;
"d. The power to order the sentence to be carried into execution;
"e. The power to remand the case for a rehearing under the provi-
sions of article 52."
"ART. 50. Appellate Review-
"a. Board of review; judicial council.-The Judge Advocate General
shall constitute, in his office, a Board of Review composed of not less than
three officers of the Judge Advocate General's Department. He shall also
constitute, in his office, a Judicial Council composed of three general officers
of the Judge Advocate General's Department: Provided, That the Judge
Advocate General may, under exigent circumstances, detail as members of
the Judicial Council, for periods not in excess of sixty days, officers of the
Judge Advocate General's Department of grades below that of general officer.
"b. Additional boards of review and judicial councils.-Whenever nec-
essary, the Judge Advocate General may constitute two or more Boards of
Review and Judicial Councils in his office, with equal powers and duties,
composed as provided in the first paragraph of this article.
"c. Branch offices.-Whenever the President deems such action neces-
sary, he may direct The Judge Advocate General to establish a'branch office,
under an Assistant Judge Advocate General who shall be a general officer of
The Judge Advocate General's Department, with any distant command, and
to establish in such branch office one or more Boards of Review and Judicial
Councils composed as provided in the first paragraph of this article.. Such
Assistant Judge Advocate General and such Board of Review and Judicial
Council shall be empowered to perform for that command under the general
supervision of The Judge Advocate General, the duties which The Judge Ad-
1949]
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vocate General and the Board of Review and Judicial Council in his office
would otherwise be required to perform in respect of all cases involving sen-
tences not requiring approval or confirmation by the President: Provided,
That the power of mitigation and remission shall not be exercised by such
Assistant Judge Advocate General or by agencies in his office, but any case
in which such action is deemed desirable shall be forwarded to The Judge
Advocate General with appropriate recommendations.
"d. Action by board of review when approval by president or con-
firming action is required.-Before any record of trial in which there has been
adjudged a sentence requiring approval or confirmation by the P'resident or
confirmation by any other confirming authority is submitted to the Presi-
dent or such other confirming authority, as the case may be, it shall be ex-
amined by the Board of Review which shall take action as follows:
"(1) In afiy case requiring action by the President, the Board of Re-
view shall submit its opinion in writing, through the Judicial
Council which shall also submit its opinion in writing, to the Judge
Advocate General, who shall, except as herein otherwise provided,
transmit the record and the Board's and Council's opinions, with
his recommendations, directly to the Secretary of the Department
of the Army for the action of the President: Provided, That the
Judicial Council, with the concurrence of the Judge Advocate
General shall have powers in respect to holdings of legal insuffi-
ciency equal to the powers vested in the Board of Review by sub-
paragraph (3) of this paragraph.
"(2) In any case requiring confirming action by,the Judicial Council
with or without the concurrence of the Judge Advocate General
when the Board of Review is of the opinion that the record of trial
is legally sufficient to support the sentence it shall submit its opin-
ion in writing to the Judicial Council for appropriate action.
"(3) When the Board of Review is of the opinion that the record of
trial in any case requiring confirming action by the President or
confirming action by the Judicial Council is legally insufficient to
support the findings of guilty and sentence, or the sentence, or
that errors of law have been committed injuriously affecting the
substantial rights of the accused, it ghall submit its holdings to the
Judge Advocate General and when the Judge Advocate General
concurs in such holding, such findings and'sentence shall thereby
be vacated in accord with such holding and the record shall be
transmitted by the Judge Advocate General to the appropriate
convening authority for a rehearing or such other action as may
be proper.
"(4) In any case requiring confirming action by, the President or con-
firming action by the Judicial Council in which the Board of Re-
view holds the record of trial legally insufficient to support the
findings of guilty and sentence, or the sentence, and the Judge
Advocate General shall not concur in the holding of the Board
of Review, the holding and the record of trial shall be transmitted
to the Judicial Council for confirming action or for other ap-
propriate action in a case in which confirmation of the sentence
by the President is required under article 48a.
"e. Action by board of review in cases involving dishonorable or bad-
conduct discharges or confinement in penitentiary.-No authority shall order
the execution of any sentence of a court-martial involving dishonorable dis-
charge not suspended, bad-conduct discharge not suspended, or confinement
[Vol. 14
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in a penitentiary unless and until the appellate review required by this article
shall have been completed and unless and until any confirming action re-
quired shall have been completed. Every record of trial by general or special
court-martial involving a sentence to dishonorable discharge or bad-conduct
discharge, whether such discharges be suspended or not suspended, and every
record of trial by general court-martial involving a sentence to confinement
in a penitentiary, other than records of trial examination of which is re-
quired by paragraph d of this article, shall be examined by the Board of
Review which shall take action as follows:
"(1) In any case in which the Board of Review holds the record of
trial legally sufficient to support the findings of guilty and sen-
tence, and confirming action is not by the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral or the Board of Review deemed necessary, the Judge Advo-
cate General shall transmit the holding to the convening au-
thority, and such hfolding shall be deemed final and conclusive.
"(2) In any case in which the Board of Review holds the record of
trial legally sufficient to support the findings of guilty and sen-
tence, but modification of the findings of guilty or the sentence is
by the Judge Advocate General or the Board of Review deemed
necessary to the ends of justice, the holding and the record of
trial shall be transmitted to the Judicial Council for confirming
action.
"(3) In any case in which the.Board of Review holds the record of
trial legally insufficient to support the findings of guilty and sen-
tence, in whole or in part, and the Judge Advocate General con-
curs in such holding, the findings and sentence shall thereby be
vacated in whole or in part in accord with such holding, and the
record shall be transmitted by the Judge Advocate General to the
convening authority for rehearing or such other action as may
be appropriate.
"(4) In any case in which the Board of Review holds the record of
trial legally insufficient to support the findings of guilty and sen-
tence, in whole or in part, and the Judge Advocate General shall
not concur in the holding of the Board of Review, the holding and
the record of trial shall be transmitted to the Judicial Council for
confirming action.
"f. Appellate action in other cases.-Every record of trial by general
court-martial the appellate review of which is not otherwise provided for by
this article shall be examined in the Office of the Judge Advocate General
and if found legally insufficient to support the findings of guilty and sen-
tence, in whole or in part, shall be transmitted to the Board ofReview for
appropriate action in accord with paragraph e of this article.
"g. Weighing evidence.-In the appellate review of records of trials
by courts-martial as provided in these articles the Judge Advocate General
and all appellate agencies in his office shall have authority to weigh evi-
dence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted ques-
tions of fact.
"h. Finality of court-martial judgments.-The appellate review of
records of trial provided by this article, the confirming action taken pursuant
to articles 48 or 49, the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-mar-
tial as heretofore or hereafter approved, reviewed, or confirmed as required
by the Articles of War and all dismissals and discharges heretofore or here-
after carried into execution pursuant to sentences by courts-martial follow-
ing approval, review, or confirmation as required by the Articles of War,
1949]
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shall be final and conclusive, and orders publishing the proceedings of courts-
martial and all action taken pursuant to such proceedings shall be binding
upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States,
subject only to action upon application for a new trial as provided in article
53."
"ART. 51. Mitigation, Remission, and Suspension of Sentences.-
"a. At the time ordered executed.-The power of the President, the
Secretary of the Department of the Army, and any reviewing authority to
order the execution of a sentence of a court-martial shall include the power
to mitigate, remit, or suspend the whole or any part thereof, except that a
death sentence may not be suspended. The Judge Advocate General shall
have the power to mitigate, remit, or suspend the whole or any part of a
sentence in any case requiring appellate review under article 50 and not re-
quiring approval or confirmation by the President, but the power to miti-
gate or remit shall be exercised by the Judge Advocate General under the
direction of the Secretary of the Department of the Army. The authority
which suspends the execution of a sentence may restore the person under
sentence to duty during such suspension; and the death or honorable dis-
charge of a person under suspended sentence shall operate as a complete re-
mission of any unexecuted or unremitted part of such sentence.
"b. Subsequent to the time ordered executed.-
"(1) Any unexecuted portion of a sentence other than a sentence of
death, including all uncollected forfeitures, adjudged by court-
martial may be mitigated, remitted or suspended and any order of
suspension may be vacated, in whole or in part, by the military
authority competent to appoint, for the command, exclusive of
penitentiaries and the United States disciplinary barracks, in
which the person under sentence may be, a court of the kind
that imposed the sentence, and the same power may be exercised
by superior military authority or by the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral under the direction of the Secretary of the Department of
the Army: Provided, That no sentence approved or confirmed by
the President shall be mitigated, remitted, or suspended by any
authority inferior to the President: And provided further, That
no order of suspension of a sentence to dishonorable discharge or
bad conduct discharge shall be vacated unless and until confirm-
ing or appellate action on the sentence has been completed as
required by articles 48 and 50.
"(2) The power to suspend a sentence shall include the power to re-
store the person affected to duty' during such suspension.
"(3) The power to mitigate, remit or suspend the sentence or any part
thereof in the case of a person confined in the United States dis-
ciplinary barracks or in a penitentiary shall be exercised by the
Secretary of the Department of the Army or by the Judge Ad-
vocate General under the direction of the Secretary of the De-
partment of the Army."
"ART. 52. Rehearings.-When any reviewing or confirming authority
disapproves a sentence or when any sentence is vacated by action of the
Board of Review or Judicial Council and the Judge Advocate General, the
reviewing or confirming authority or the Judge Advocate General may
authorize or direct a rehearing. Such rehearing shall take place before a
court-martial composed of members not members of the court-martial which
first heard the case. Upon such rehearing the accused shall not be tried for
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any offense of which he was found not guilty by the first court-martial, and
no sentence in excess of or more severe than the original sentence shall be
enforced unless the sentence be based upon a finding of guilty of an offense
not considered upon the merits in the original proceeding."
"ART. 53. Petition for New Trial.-Under such regulations as the Pres-
ident may prescribe, the Judge Advocate General is authorized upon ap-
plication of an accused person, and upon good cause shown, in his discretion
to grant a new trial, or to vacate a sentence, restore rights, privileges, and
property affected by such sentence, and substitute for a dismissal, dishon-
orable discharge, or bad conduct discharge previously executed a form of
discharge authorized for administrative issuance, in any court-martial case
in which the application is made within one year after final disposition of
the case upon initial appellate review: Provided, That with regard to cases
involving offenses committed during World War II, the application for a
new trial may be made within one year after termination of the war, or
after its final disposition upon initial appellate review as herein provided,
whichever is the later: Provided, That only one such application for a new
trial may be entertained with regard to any one case: And provided firth-er,
That all action by the Judge Advocate General pursuant to this article, and
all proceedings, findings, and sentences on new trials under this article, as
approved, reviewed, or confirmed under articles 47, 48, 49, and 50, and all
dismissals and discharges carried into execution pursuant to sdntences ad-
judged on new trials and approved, reviewed, or confirmed, shall be final
and conclusive and orders publishing the action of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral or the proceedings on new trial and all action taken pursuant to such
proceedings, shall be binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and
officers of the United States."
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